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Abstract
This paper analyzes the implications of advertising for fi rm dynamics and economic growth 
through its interaction with R&D investment at the fi rm level. We develop a model of endogenous 
growth with fi rm heterogeneity that incorporates advertising decisions. We calibrate the 
model to match several empirical regularities across fi rm size using U.S. data. Through a 
novel interaction between R&D and advertising, our model provides microfoundations for the 
empirically observed negative relationship between both fi rm R&D intensity and growth, and 
fi rm size. Our model predicts substitutability between R&D and advertising at the fi rm level. 
Lower advertising costs are associated with lower R&D investment and slower economic 
growth. We provide empirical evidence supporting substitution between R&D and advertising 
using exogenous changes in the tax treatment of R&D expenditures across U.S. states. Finally, 
we fi nd that R&D subsidies are more effective under an economy that includes advertising 
relative to one with no advertising.
Keywords: endogenous growth, advertising, innovation, research and development, fi rm 
dynamics, policy.
JEL classifi cation: E20, L10, M30, O31, O32, O33, O41.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza las consecuencias que los gastos publicitarios tienen para la dinámica 
empresarial y el crecimiento económico, a través de la interacción entre la publicidad 
y los gastos en investigación y desarrollo (I+D) en las empresas. Presentamos un modelo 
de crecimiento económico endógeno con heterogeneidad entre empresas que incorpora 
decisiones sobre gastos en publicidad. Calibramos el modelo usando microdatos para 
Estados Unidos, con el fi n de estudiar patrones empíricos existentes entre empresas de 
distinto tamaño. Mediante la interacción entre publicidad e I+D, nuestro modelo propone una 
nueva explicación para la correlación negativa observada en los datos entre la intensidad 
innovadora y el tamaño empresarial. Nuestro modelo predice que los gastos en publicidad y 
en I+D son sustitutos en las empresas. Reducir costes publicitarios conlleva una reducción 
de inversión en I+D, así como una ralentización del crecimiento económico. A continuación, 
presentamos la evidencia empírica que demuestra la existencia de dicha sustitución mediante 
el uso de variación regional exógena en la política impositiva estadounidense referente a 
gastos en I+D. Finalmente, demostramos que los subsidios a la innovación son más efectivos 
en una economía que permita a las empresas publicitar sus productos respecto a una en la 
que la publicidad no esté permitida. 
Palabras clave: crecimiento endógeno, publicidad, innovación, investigación y desarrollo, 
dinámicas empresariales, políticas públicas.
Códigos JEL: E20, L10, M30, O31, O32, O33, O41.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal contributions of Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and
Aghion and Howitt (1992), the economic literature has widely emphasized the role of in-
novation in the process of economic growth. Research and Development (R&D) introduces
goods of higher quality and enhanced production technologies which raise living standards.
From a firm’s perspective, innovation is used strategically to increase profits: by performing
R&D, firms can increase their market share by selling higher quality goods and diverting de-
mand from lower-quality products. Yet, while this process and its implications for economic
growth are relatively well understood in the literature, there exists a variety of other tools
that firms may use to direct demand towards their products.1 One non-negligible example
is advertising.
By advertising their goods, firms can alter consumer preferences and ultimately increase
product-specific profits. This suggests that innovation and advertising may be substitutable
tools in firms’ quest for higher profits. Additionally, advertising and innovation investments
may also be complementary, as the former type of investment raises the return to innovation
by increasing market shares of new products. In either view, advertising decisions are not
neutral in terms of global economic growth. In fact, both these types of investment represent
sizable expenditures in aggregate terms. Over the 1980-2013 period in the U.S., the share
of R&D expenditures over GDP fluctuated between 2.27% and 2.82%.2 Over the same time
period, firms in the U.S. spent on average around 2.2% of GDP on advertising each year.3
Yet, the growth literature is relatively silent on the potential interaction between R&D and
advertising expenditures and its potential impact on firm growth, firm dynamics and long
run economic development.
In this paper, we ask how advertising affects R&D investment decisions at the firm level
and study the implications for economic growth and firm dynamics. We build a flexible model
that captures different dimensions of complementarity and substitutability between R&D and
advertising. Our calibrated model shows that a decrease in the relative cost of advertising
can have significant detrimental effects on long run economic growth as the substitution
effect dominates. We provide supportive empirical evidence for substitution between R&D
and advertising using U.S. firm-level data. We also find that the interaction between R&D
and advertising can generate some observed empirical regularities related to firm dynamics,
such as decreasing firm growth rates with firm size (a deviation from the so-called Gibrat’s
law) as well as decreasing R&D intensity with firm size.
1A recent trend in the macroeconomic literature has started investigating several types of intangible investment
and their potential implications for the overall economy. See for instance, McGrattan and Prescott (2014), McGrat-
tan (2017), Gourio and Rudanko (2014a), Hall (2014), Molinari and Turino (2015), Gourio and Rudanko (2014b),
Arkolakis (2010, 2016) and Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).
2Source: OECD data, available at http://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm.
3Source: Coen Structured Advertising Expenditure Dataset, extracted from the McCann Erikson advertising
agency (available at http://www.purplemotes.net/2008/09/14/us-advertising-expenditure-data/).
Theoretically, we build on the Akcigit and Kerr (2018) model of endogenous growth
through R&D, which we extend to incorporate explicit advertising decisions. Firms are het-
erogenous and own different portfolios of goods that they monopolistically supply. Product
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quality grows on a ladder through innovation arising from investment in R&D, which can take
two forms in our model. Through internal R&D, firms can increase the quality of their own
goods. External R&D, on the other hand, enables incumbent firms and potential entrants
to improve on the quality of a good that they do not own and displace the former producer
through creative destruction. Besides R&D, firms can use advertising to expand their mar-
ket shares and profit. Firms use advertising to influence the perception that consumers have
of their goods, thereby altering preferences and ultimately shifting demand toward those
products.
We calibrate the model via indirect inference using both aggregate and micro-level data.
Our model is calibrated to match four empirical facts related to firm dynamics and investment
across firm size. Figure 1 shows these four facts. The upper-left panel displays the average
growth rate of publicly-listed firms in the U.S., by size quintiles.4 Growth rates are higher
for smaller firms and are consistently decreasing with firm size. The upper-right panel shows
that small firms also tend to be relatively more R&D intensive. This suggests that smaller
firms experience higher growth through relatively higher R&D investments, a conclusion
that has sometimes been interpreted in the existing literature as evidence of differences in
R&D technology across firm size. This can have important implications in terms of policy
recommendations (e.g. Akcigit (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2018) or Akcigit and Kerr (2018)).
If small firms are more efficient at innovating, R&D subsidies targeted at small firms may
be optimal. An important question is then to understand the source of the deviation from
constant R&D intensity across firm size. In this context, our paper provides microfoundations
for this deviation. We show that the observation that R&D intensity diminishes with firm size
can arise as the result of the optimal allocation of resources between R&D and advertising
at the firm level.
Our calibration is also disciplined by two new facts about advertising. First, we find a
negative relationship between advertising intensity (i.e., advertising expenditures normalized
by size) and firm size, which can be observed in the lower-left panel of Figure 1. Second, we
find that larger firms rely relatively more on advertising compared to R&D, as the ratio of
R&D to advertising expenditures decreases with firm size (lower-right panel in Figure 1).
Our calibration delivers two main implications regarding the interaction between R&D
and advertising. First, our results show the existence of a substitution effect between R&D
and advertising at the firm level. A decrease in the cost of advertising leads to an increase
in the entry rate and in creative destruction. This, in turn, decreases the incentive for
incumbent firms to invest in R&D and shifts the firm size distribution to the left (larger
4Data include U.S. listed companies performing R&D and advertising between 1980 and 2015 from the Compu-
stat database. More details on the sample selection in Section 3.
mass of small firms). Overall, investment in R&D decreases which leads to a decrease in
economic growth. In particular, we predict that the growth rate of the economy would be
0.64 percentage points higher if advertising is shut down from the model. Second, we find
that the interaction between R&D and advertising can quantitatively deliver the four facts
reported in Figure 1, which suggests that the deviation from constant R&D intensity across
firm size should not necessarily be interpreted as evidence for differences in R&D efficiency
across firms.
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The main new mechanisms in our model are based on well-established empirical obser-
vations from the marketing literature. Crucially, there is ample evidence in this literature
that larger firms have a cost advantage in terms of advertising compared to firms with fewer
products. One reason for this size advantage comes from a spillover effect through differ-
ent goods under the same brand name (umbrella branding). By advertising one product, a
firm can influence not only the perception of the quality of the advertised good but also of
other goods sharing the same brand name. The existence of this spillover effect alters firms’
dynamic incentives to engage in R&D. As smaller firms gain relatively more in terms of ad-
vertising spillover from acquiring an additional product, they optimally choose to perform
relatively more (external) R&D in order to expand into new product markets. As a result,
these firms grow relatively faster than large ones.
To validate our estimation, we show that the calibrated model also matches several un-
targeted moments among which the observed decrease in the variance of firm growth, as
well as of R&D and advertising intensity, with firm size. Moreover, using exogenous vari-
Notes: Firms are ranked in size quintiles according to their normalized level of sales (sales
as a ratio of average sales in the same year). R&D and advertising intensities are measured
as the ratio of total R&D and advertising expenditures to total sales within each group.
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
Fact #1: Sales growth
1 2 3 4 50
0.1
0.2
Fact #2: R&D / Sales
1 2 3 4 50
0.02
0.04
0.06
Size Quintile
Fact #3: ADV / Sales
1 2 3 4 50
2
4
Size Quintile
Fact #4: R&D / ADV
Q1 − Q5:
   72.6%
decrease
Q1 − Q5:
    83.0%
decrease
Q1 − Q5:
   58.5%
decrease
Q1 − Q5:
   34.0%
decrease
Figure 1: Firm growth, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, and R&D-advertising ratio,
across firm size quintiles.
ation in the cost of R&D arising from changes in the tax treatment of R&D expenditures
across U.S. states and over time, we provide empirical evidence supporting the substitution
between R&D and advertising which is at the core of the predictions of our calibrated model.
Interestingly, we also find that R&D is complementary to other types of expenditures.
In the last part of the paper, we study the policy implications of our model. First,
we show that taxes on advertising, while desirable from the angle of growth, might have a
relatively small impact because (i) the elasticity of advertising to sales is low, and (ii) the tax
deters the entry of small and innovative firms. Second, we show that identifying the source
of the observed decrease in R&D intensity with firm size is relevant for R&D policy. R&D
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subsidies are more effective at promoting economic growth if the deviation from constant
R&D intensity comes from the interaction between R&D and advertising rather than from
technological differences in terms of R&D efficiency across firm size (for example, the increase
in growth is 0.12 percentage point higher in the former case for a 50% subsidy). We further
show that the model with advertising performs better in terms of matching moments related
to firm growth and R&D intensity across firm size.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a comprehensive review
of the literature with a special focus on endogenous growth, firm dynamics and the mar-
keting literature used to motivate our advertising modeling approach. Section 3 presents
key empirical facts related to Gibrat’s law, R&D and advertising intensity at the firm level,
as well as the relative use of R&D and advertising across firm size. We then describe the
model in Section 4. Section 5 presents the calibration and shows that our novel advertising
mechanism is able to quantitatively replicate the main empirical regularities described in
Section 3. We also utilize the calibrated model to ask how advertising affects the firm size
distribution, firm entry rates and economic growth. In Section 6 we present a set of valida-
tion exercises, including the model’s performance in terms of untargeted moments (in Section
6.1), and empirical evidence supporting the main mechanism at work behind the calibrated
model (in Section 6.2). Section 7 investigates policy implications regarding advertising taxes
and R&D subsidies. We also compare the quantitative performance of our baseline model
with a calibration without advertising in matching moments. Section 8 concludes. The Ap-
pendix includes proofs of all the results, model extensions mentioned in the main text, and
additional tables and figures.
2 Related Literature
Our work is related to several strands of the literature. First and foremost, we build upon
models of endogenous firm growth through product innovation. This area was pioneered
by Klette and Kortum (2004), who built a stylized version of the Schumpeterian creative-
destruction models of Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) into a
model of multi-product firm dynamics. Their work is able to exhibit several patterns that
are consistent with empirical finding coming from micro-level data, especially regarding the
right-skewness in the firm size distribution, the persistence in firms’ R&D investments, and
the volatility of innovation in the cross-section of firms.5
However, by assuming that firm productivity scales perfectly with size, this framework
fails to explain why firms of different sizes may grow at different rates. Indeed, empirical
studies have argued that there exist deviations from Gibrat’s law among innovative firms:
small establishments grow faster than large ones, and net exit rates are a decreasing function
of size.6
5The applied work by Lentz and Mortensen (2008) further unveiled the predictive power of the Klette and
Kortum (2004) model by putting it to a rigorous empirical test.
6See Hall (1987), Sutton (1997), Caves (1998), and Geroski (1998). For a survey of this empirical literature, see
Santarelli et al. (2006).
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7Cohen and Klepper (1996) show that small innovating firms generate more innovations per dollar spent in
R&D, and Akcigit and Kerr (2018) show that small firms spend more in R&D per dollar of sales.
8For instance, weak scalability in the innovation technology (Akcigit and Kerr (2018)); larger step sizes of
technical advance for small firms (Acemoglu and Cao (2015)); or lower productive capacity as a highly absorbing
state (Acemoglu et al. (2018)).
One contributor to such phenomenon is that smaller firms tend to be more innovation-
intensive.7 Accordingly, a wave of second-generation models of innovation-driven firm growth
has emerged (Acemoglu et al. (2018), Acemoglu and Cao (2015) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018),
among others). These papers extend the Klette and Kortum (2004) framework to include het-
erogeneity in innovation technologies in order to incorporate a more meaningful interaction
between different types of research (e.g., product versus process, radical versus incremental),
as well as between entrants and incumbent firms. These models are able to replicate the
observed size-dependence of growth and R&D through size-dependent R&D technological ef-
ficiency.8 In contrast, we propose a microfounded theory that is able to deliver size-dependent
growth and R&D intensity even in the absence of size-dependent R&D technologies. Our
novel trade-off between innovation and advertising decisions introduces the required non-
homogeneities in equilibrium. Specifically, we rely on two main strands of the marketing
literature in order to build a motive for advertising into our endogenous growth framework.
First, in our model, larger firms experience higher returns to advertising expenditures.
A large body of the marketing literature identifies this phenomenon as the equity value
of so-called “umbrella-branding”. These studies suggest that there exist spillovers between
goods within the firm, in the sense that increasing advertising expenditures on one good
not only increases sales for that good but also indirectly for all other goods under the same
brand. Lane and Jacobson (1995) and Tauber (1981, 1988) argue that brand developments
can decrease marketing costs, and Rangaswamy et al. (1993) suggest that they can enhance
marketing productivity. Moreover, Smith and Park (1992) show that they can help capture
greater market share. Morrin (1999) provides evidence that exposure to advertising of brand
extension facilitates parent brand recall. Using household scanner panel data for the U.S.,
Balachander and Ghose (2003) find a positive and significant spillover effect of advertising
for multiple product categories and geographic markets. Dacin and Smith (1994) show, by
means of controlled experiments, a positive relationship between the number of products af-
filiated with a brand and consumers’ confidence in the quality extension of the brand. Erdem
(1998) argues empirically that the quality perceptions of a brand in a product category are
positively affected by the consumer’s experience with the same brand in a different category,
because branding allows consumers to learn faster about quality through use experience.
More specifically for our purposes, Erdem and Sun (2002) show that the effects identified in
Erdem (1998) further translate to positive spillovers between advertising and sales for differ-
ent goods within the same brand. Particularly, such effects are present in innovation-driven
industries, e.g. the car industry (Sullivan (1990) and Bu¨schken (2007)) or the pharmaceutical
industry (see Suppliet (2016)).
The second observation that we draw from the marketing literature is that higher-quality
goods benefit relatively more from advertising: everything else equal, a good that compares
better to other goods within the brand in terms of quality experiences higher increases in
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9See Kirmani and Rao (2000) and Bagwell (2007) for a survey of the literature.
sales per dollar spent into advertising. Archibald et al. (1983) and Caves and Greene (1996)
find a positive correlation between advertising and quality for innovative goods. Tellis and
Fornell (1988) examine the relationship over the product life cycle, and find that advertising
and profitability are both positively correlated to quality. Finally, Homer (1995), Kirmani
and Wright (1989) and Kirmani (1990, 1997) offer experimental evidence suggesting that
the positive relationship exists because consumers perceive higher advertising expenditures
indicating that the good is of high quality.9
Regarding advertising in Economics, our paper relates to a long tradition studying ad-
vertising as an explicit factor affecting consumer tastes, as in Dorfman and Steiner (1954),
Dixit and Norman (1978), Becker and Murphy (1993) and Benhabib and Bisin (2002). Our
approach is similar to those in that firms’ advertising effectively acts as a demand shifter in
equilibrium. A parallel body of literature introduces a role for valuable customer capital into
macro models, viewing marketing as a tool to build continuing buyer-seller relationships for
firms due to either the existence of frictions in product markets (e.g. Gourio and Rudanko
(2014b), Hall (2008), Roldan and Gilbukh (2018)) or because of costs to market penetration
(e.g. Arkolakis (2010, 2016) and Eaton et al. (2014)). Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu (2012) and
Perla (2017) view advertising as a way of signalling firm efficiency and raising product aware-
ness among customers, respectively, and focus on the implications for industry dynamics and
the degree of market competition. Fitzgerald and Priolo (2018) find empirical support for the
idea that marketing and advertising activities are important for firm growth. Fishman and
Rob (2003) study the implications of customer accumulation for firm size and R&D choices,
but they also do not focus on how marketing and innovation interact. To our knowledge, only
Grossmann (2008) has considered this potential interaction in a general equilibrium model.
However, while in that paper advertising and R&D are assumed to be direct complements,
we opt to be agnostic about the degree of complementarity between the two, and instead dis-
cipline their substitutability by matching directly firm-level cross-sectional data. In addition,
we incorporate firm heterogeneity which allows us to study the implications of advertising
for firm dynamics. Moreover, our policy analysis puts a special emphasis on how advertising
alters both the R&D-vs-advertising composition of firm investment on the intensive margin,
and the size distribution of firms on the extensive margin.
3 Empirical Findings
In this section, we present empirical results on firm growth, R&D and advertising expen-
ditures. Some of the coefficients that we obtain will then be used to calibrate the model that
is presented in Section 4 where we show that these facts can be explained as the result of an
optimal allocation of resources between R&D and advertising at the firm level.
Data We use annual data on U.S. listed companies from Compustat over the period 1980-
2015. Firms reporting nonpositive sales or nonpositive employment are excluded from the
sample. We also exclude non-innovative (i.e., no R&D expenditures) and non-advertising (i.e.,
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10Using different thresholds does not change the sign nor the significance of the coefficients.
11Table A.2 shows similar results for all four facts when size is measured by assets and employment.
no advertising expenditures) firms. To exclude outliers, we ignore firms experiencing year-on-
year sales growth rates of more than 1,000%, as well as R&D-to-sales and advertising-to-sales
ratios of more than 100%.10 Moreover, we exclude mergers and acquisitions, and in order
to correct for a possible survival bias in the growth regressions, we make the conservative
assumption that exiting firms have a growth rate of –100% in their last period of operation.
Basic descriptive statistics of the resulting sample are reported in Table A.1 of Appendix D.
Empirical Facts and Relation to the Literature Our main focus is on the regres-
sion results for the four empirical facts that we presented in Figure 1. We use firm sales as
our baseline measure of firm size.11 All four regressions are of the form:
yij,t = α0 + β1 log(Salesij,t) + β2FirmAgeij,t + β3FinConstij,t + αj + αt + uij,t
for firm i in industry j in year t, where αt controls for time fixed effects and αj controls
for industry fixed effects. The dependent variable is:
yij,t ∈
{
ΔSalesij,t
Salesij,t
, log
(
R&Dij,t
Salesij,t
)
, log
(
Advij,t
Salesij,t
)
, log
(
R&Dij,t
Advij,t
)}
for each of the four facts, respectively. To control for firm characteristics, we include firm
age, which we measure as the number of years elapsed since the firm first appeared in the
sample,12 and a measure of financial constraints, which is the difference between sales and
purchases of common and preferred stock as a share of firm sales.
In the results that follow, Facts #1 and #2 (related to firm growth and R&D intensity,
respectively) confirm results that have already been discussed in the literature. We then
introduce two new facts that relate to advertising and R&D (Facts #3 and #4). These new
facts highlight that firms of different sizes have different advertising intensities and that they
use R&D and advertising in different proportions.
Fact #1: Smaller innovative firms grow faster on average.
Column (1) in Table 1 shows that there exists a significant deviation from Gibrat’s law
among innovative firms in our sample. The results show that larger innovative firms tend
to experience lower growth rates in terms of sales. A 1% increase in sales translates into a
0.0325% decrease in sale growth.
12This measure of firm age in the Compustat database is standard and has been used among others by Shumway
(2001), Lubos and Veronesi (2003) and Fama and French (2004).
13Haltiwanger et al. (2013) argue, using data about the whole universe of firms in the U.S., that the observed
deviation from Gibrat’s law does not systematically hold when one controls for firm age. In column (2) of Table
1, we find that the significant deviation from Gibrat’s law still holds after controlling for firm age in our sample of
innovative firms.
These results provide evidence that is similar to that reported in Akcigit (2009) and
Akcigit and Kerr (2018).13 The phenomenon has also been studied in the literature within
different theoretical frameworks. Models of firm dynamics following Hopenhayn (1992), based
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ΔSales
Sales log
(
R&D
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
R&D
Adv
)
log(Sales) -0.0325 -0.1035 -0.0317 -0.0719
(0.00288) (0.00892) (0.01000) (0.0120)
Firm Age -0.00441 0.00296 0.000688 0.00227
(0.000367) (0.00161) (0.00190) (0.00219)
Fin. Const. 0.00270 0.00538 0.00745 -0.00207
(0.00172) (0.00304) (0.00432) (0.00498)
Time FE    
Industry FE    
Observations 24856 24856 24856 24856
R2 0.09 0.50 0.28 0.28
Notes: Compustat data (1980-2015). The sample is restricted to firms reporting strictly pos-
itive sales, strictly positive employment, strictly positive R&D and advertising expenditures,
with year-on-year sales growth less than 1,000%, and R&D-to-sales and advertising-to-sales
ratios of less than 100%. Mergers and acquisitions have been excluded from the sample.
Age is measured as the elapsed time since the first observation in the data. Our measure
of financial constraints is sale minus purchases of common and preferred stock, divided by
sales. Sales and advertising expenditures are in thousands of U.S.D. Standard errors are
clustered by firm (in parentheses).
Table 1: Firm level regressions (Fact #1 - #4).
on stochastic (Markov) productivity shocks, can replicate the negative correlation between
firm size and firm growth. If the set of productivity shocks is finite and mean-reverting, larger
firms (i.e., firms with higher productivity) eventually face a limit to growth and experience
lower average growth rates. Jovanovic (1982), in contrast, proposes a model of learning in
which firms receive noisy signals about their productivity. In his model, younger firms are
more uncertain about their productivity and hence learn more than older firms, leading to
higher growth rates. The correlation between firm size and firm growth in such a setting thus
comes through an age effect and the positive correlation between age and size. Consequently,
in this type of models, the observed association between firm size and firm growth should
vanish as one controls for firm age.14 Yet, we find that the size effect is still significant after
controlling for age.
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) link the dependence of firm growth on size and age to financial
market frictions. In a model of firm dynamics similar to that of Hopenhayn (1992), Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) show that the interaction of persistent productivity shocks with costly
equity issuance and default generates a higher financial leverage for small and young firms and
qualitatively replicates the decreasing relationship between firm size, firm age and expected
growth.15 In column (1) of Table 1, we find that the deviation from constant growth holds
after controlling for financial constraints.16
14Clementi and Palazzo (2016) propose an extension of the Hopenhayn (1992) model with capital accumulation
in which, conditional on size, growth rates are on average decreasing in age.
15See also Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Itenberg (2015) links the high innovation intensity of small firms to
their extensive use of external equity financing. For a related approach, see Schmitz (2017).
16This result is consistent with the findings of Dinlersoz et al. (2018) for their sub-sample of public firms.
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17Acemoglu et al. (2018) also propose a model in which older and larger firms invest relatively less in R&D and
grow more slowly as a result, while Acemoglu et al. (2014) link innovation to the age of managers.
Fact #2: Smaller innovative firms have higher R&D intensity on average.
An emerging trend in the economic growth literature has investigated the departure from
constant growth across firm size by linking it to another cross-sectional empirical fact related
to firm size: the higher R&D intensity of smaller firms (see, for example, Akcigit (2009),
Acemoglu and Cao (2015), and Akcigit and Kerr (2018)). As larger firms invest relatively
less in innovation, they experience relatively lower growth rates.17
Column (2) in Table 1 shows that this pattern holds in our sample as well: larger firms
are less R&D intensive. The effect of age on R&D intensity is positive though not strongly
significant. A 1% increase in sales translates into a 0.1035% decrease in the R&D expenditure
to sales ratio.
In sum, smaller innovative firms grow relatively faster, and these firms spend relatively
more in R&D. While we are not the first ones to make these observations using Compustat
data (see, for instance, Akcigit (2009) and Itenberg (2015)), we show in addition that size
remains significant after controlling for age and financial constraint both in growth and R&D
intensity regressions, which suggests that explanations based on the firm’s product life-cycle
and financial constraints cannot entirely account for the deviation from Gibrat’s law observed
in the data. We propose an alternative explanation for this deviation based on the interaction
between R&D and advertising in firms’ optimal decisions. For this, we present two new facts
which are used to calibrate our model.
Fact #3: Smaller innovative firms have higher advertising intensity on average.
Column (3) in Table 1 shows that advertising intensity is decreasing in firm size: smaller
firms spend more in advertising per dollar of sales. Once again, this correlation remains
significant after controlling for age and financial constraints. We find that a 1% increase in
sales translates into a 0.0317% decrease in the advertising expenditure to sales ratio.
Fact #4: Smaller innovative firms have higher R&D to advertising ratios on average.
Finally, in column (4) of Table 1, we find that larger firms tend to use relatively more
advertising than R&D, as the ratio of R&D to advertising expenditure is significantly de-
creasing in size. In particular, a 1% increase in sales leads to a 0.0719% decrease in the R&D
to advertising expenditure ratio. This suggests that as innovative firms grow larger, they
tend to substitute R&D for advertising. We also find that the effect of age on the relative
use of R&D and advertising is not robustly significant.
Overall, these results suggest that the interaction between R&D and advertising can
potentially affect firm growth through a size effect, consistent with the advertising spillover
that our model captures. In addition, our calibrated model will deliver all four of these
predictions in equilibrium.
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4 An Endogenous Growth Model with Advertising
Inspired by the empirical findings of the previous section, we build a theory of advertising
into a model of endogenous growth. The basic structure follows the framework set up by
Klette and Kortum (2004), and specifically allows for heterogeneous innovations as in the
recent work by Akcigit and Kerr (2018). The advertising theory, on the other hand, is based
on empirical regularities that we take from the marketing literature. Our broader goal is to
illustrate a novel interplay between innovation and advertising, which critically shapes firms’
dynamic incentives for growth and growth in the economy as a whole.
4.1 Environment
Preferences Time is continuous, infinite, and indexed by t ∈ R+. The economy is popu-
lated by a measure-one of identical, infinitely-lived individuals with discount rate ρ > 0. A
representative household has preferences given by:
U =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln
(
Ct
)
dt (1)
where Ct is consumption of the single final good, whose price is normalized to Pt = 1, ∀t.
The household is endowed with one unit of time every instant, which is supplied inelastically
to the productive sector of the economy in the form of labor. The wage rate is denoted by
wt and is determined endogenously to clear the labor market. The household owns all the
firms in the economy and carries each period a stock of wealth At, equal to the total value
of corporate assets. Wealth earns an instantaneous and time-varying rate of return rt. The
flow budget constraint is A˙t = rtAt + wt − Ct for a given A0 ≥ 0.
Final Good Sector The final good is produced by a representative final good firm using
a measure-one continuum of input varieties, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], which are supplied by an
intermediate good sector. Technology is given by the Cobb-Douglas production function:
Yt =
1
1− β
∫ 1
0
q˜βjty
1−β
jt dj
where β ∈ (0, 1). yjt is the quantity of intermediate good j that is used at time t.
Quantities are weighted by the term q˜jt, which stands for the quality of the good that is
being perceived by agents in the economy.
Product Qualities The total perceived quality q˜jt of a certain good j at time t is defined
by:
q˜jt ≡ qjt(1 + djt)
Total perceived quality includes two components. The first component, referred to as the
intrinsic quality of the product and denoted by qjt > 0, stands for the currently leading-edge
technological efficiency of the product. This component of quality is built over time through
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18We borrow the nomenclature “intrinsic”, “extrinsic” and “perceived” from the marketing literature (e.g., Zei-
thaml (1988)).
a process of technical innovation. In particular, it advances on a ladder, as in the models of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). This phenomenon is induced
by expenditures into R&D at the productive sector level. The second component in total
perceived quality is the so-called extrinsic quality of the product, given by φjt ≡ qjtdjt,
where djt ≥ 0 denotes advertising-induced quality.18 This component of total quality refers
to the part of total perceived quality of a good that is induced by the producer’s advertising
efforts on that specific product. Therefore, we may also refer to φjt as the effectiveness of
advertising product j in period t.
This functional form implies that intrinsic (qj) and extrinsic (φj) quality are substitutes
at the good level, as they enter additively into total quality. However, note that we also allow
for a degree of complementarity coming from the fact that φjt is itself an increasing function
of intrinsic quality, qj . Namely, advertising is effective in raising perceived quality only if the
good has nonzero intrinsic quality, and it is more effective the higher the intrinsic quality
of the good. This dual substitution and complementarity is consistent with the marketing
literature reviewed in Section 2. It will also allow us flexibility when calibrating the model,
as in equilibrium the two technologies may be substitutes or complements at the firm level,
depending on parameter values.19
In our model, advertising acts as a preference shifter. This follows Dixit and Norman
(1978), Becker and Murphy (1993), Benhabib and Bisin (2002) and Molinari and Turino
(2015), among others, who model advertising through product-specific taste parameters or
as an explicit argument in the utility function.20 In Appendix G.2, we present various
alternative ways to model advertising and show that, in all cases, advertising appears as a
demand shifter.
We further adopt the view that advertising is persuasive, and not purely informative. By
this we mean that consumers cannot choose what information to be exposed to, but rather
behave according to the shifts in tastes induced by advertising, which they take as given.21
Yet, as we show in Appendix G.2.4, a version of our model in which advertising is informative
about the product’s quality would also feature the type of demand shift in equilibrium that
our baseline specification exhibits.
Finally, although we model advertising as a static component of firm profits, its choice
embodies a general-equilibrium effect that critically changes the dynamic incentives of acquir-
ing new product lines through R&D, and it thus has an indirect effect on firm and economic
growth. For completeness, in Appendix G.2.1, we introduce an extension with accumulation
of a stock of advertising (or so-called “goodwill” accumulation) over time, and show that this
would not affect the qualitative results that we obtain in our baseline model.
Production Sector At any instant, there is an endogenously determined set F (of mea-
sure F > 0) of active incumbent producers operating in a monopolistically competitive
19See the comparative statics in Appendix F.
20In the baseline model, advertising appears in the final good sector’s production function. In Appendix G.2.2,
we show that a model in which advertising features in the utility function is isomorphic to our baseline model.
21For an extensive discussion of the two views on advertising, see Becker and Murphy (1993).
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product market. Each good j ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single firm f ∈ F , and a single firm
may own multiple goods. A firm owns a product if it can produce it at a higher intrinsic
quality than any other firm. A firm f is summarized by the countable set of products for
which it has the leading-edge technology, denoted Jf ⊆ [0, 1]. The number of active product
lines owned by firm f is n ≡ |Jf | ∈ Z+. Finally, the product portfolio quality of firm f is
given by qf ≡ {qj : j ∈ Jf} ∈ Rn+.
Each good variety j is produced with linear technology, yjt = Q¯tljt, where ljt is labor input
and Q¯t ≡
∫ 1
0 qjtdj is the average intrinsic quality in the economy. This linear formulation
implies that all good producers face the same marginal cost, wt/Q¯t. Moreover, by making
production scale with aggregate quality, we can ensure that output grows at the same rate
as productivity, which is necessary for the existence of a balanced growth path equilibrium.
4.2 Quality Improvements
Even though R&D-induced intrinsic quality innovations in the production sector are the
only engine of long run growth in the economy, firms can choose to advertise on their currently
owned product lines in order to increase demand through the extrinsic quality margin. In
this section, we introduce both of these quality enhancement margins.
Improving Intrinsic Quality (q) Firms can invest in R&D to either improve their own
product lines (so-called internal innovation) or to build upon the intrinsic quality of goods
that are currently produced by other incumbent monopolists (so-called external innovation).
Firms expand or contract in the product space on the basis of these innovations.22
Particularly, to create a Poisson flow rate zj ≥ 0 of improving the intrinsic quality of its
own product j ∈ Jf , a firm f must spend a cost of Rz(zj) units of the final good. This cost
function is assumed to be convex in the innovation rate and linear in quality, so that
Rz(zj) = χ̂qjz
ψ̂
j
where χ̂ > 0 and ψ̂ > 1. If successful, internal R&D improves intrinsic quality by a
factor of (1 + λI) > 1, so that qj,t+Δt = (1 + λ
I)qjt if there is only one innovation within an
arbitrarily small time interval of size Δt > 0. The fact that Rz increases with qj captures
that more advanced technologies face higher R&D costs.
External R&D is undertaken by incumbents and potential entrants. For simplicity, ex-
ternal R&D is assumed to be undirected, so that the successful innovator uniformly draws
a good from the set [0, 1].23 Incumbents and entrants face, however, different innovation
technologies.
22Garcia-Macia et al. (2016) show that both internal and external innovations by incumbent firms contribute
significantly to aggregate growth. In our model, advertising affects the firm R&D-size relationship through external
innovation intensity only. Our calibration delivers a share of growth coming from internal innovation that is in line
with Garcia-Macia et al. (2016).
23By the law of large numbers, this draws a good that is almost-surely not in the innovator’s current portfolio of
products.
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On the one hand, entrants (firms with n = 0) must incur an expenditure of
Re(xe) = νQ¯xe
units of the final good in order to generate a Poisson flow rate of xe for acquiring their
first product, where ν > 0 is a constant parameter. We assume that there is a measure-one
mass of potential entrants, and determine xe by a free-entry condition.
24
On the other hand, in order to create a flow Poisson rate of Xn, an incumbent firm with
n ≥ 1 product lines must incur an expenditure of Rx(Xn, n) units of the final good. In
particular, the cost function is assumed to be convex in the rate of innovation, Xn, such that
Rx(Xn, n) = χ˜Q¯X
ψ˜
n n
σ
where χ˜ > 0, ψ˜ > 1, and σ ≤ 0. If successful, external R&D improves intrinsic quality
by a factor of (1 + λE) > 1, so that qj,t+Δt = (1 + λ
E)qjt for a randomly selected product
line j ∈ [0, 1], if there is only one innovation within an arbitrarily small time interval of size
Δt > 0.
We define total R&D expenditure by a firm of size n choosing innovation rates ({zj}, Xn)
by:
Rn ≡
∑
j∈J
Rz(zj) +Rx(Xn, n) (2)
Slightly abusing terminology, we say that there exist decreasing, constant, or increasing
returns to scale in R&D if an n-product firms finds it respectively more expensive, as ex-
pensive, or less expensive to grow through innovation by a given rate than n firms of one
product each.
On the one hand, as we shall see, the specification for Rz ensures that zj = z, ∀j, because
both costs and benefits of internal innovations are linear in quality. This is equivalent as
internal R&D scaling proportionally with firm size, which we label as constant returns to
scale. Therefore, the degree of returns to scale in the R&D technology operates solely through
external innovations.
Absent our advertising margin, it is this degree of scalability which determines whether
the model can deliver the empirically observed deviations from Gibrat’s law. With constant
returns to scale in innovation costs (i.e, ψ˜ + σ = 1), ex-ante technological advantages do not
exist with respect to differences in firm size. In other words, in a model without advertising,
external innovation investment would in this case scale up one-for-one with added product
lines. This naturally delivers a theoretical version of Gibrat’s law, as in the model of Klette
and Kortum (2004): firm growth is independent of firm size, n.
Because this specialization of the model is ill-suited to analyze why smaller firms are more
innovation-intensive in the data, subsequent work has relaxed the assumption of homogeneity
of degree one on the returns to innovation. Akcigit and Kerr (2018) extend the Klette and
Kortum (2004) framework to incorporate decreasing returns to external R&D (i.e, ψ˜+σ > 1).
24In equilibrium, xe denotes both the optimal Poisson rate of entry and the mass of entrants.
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In contrast, we remain agnostic regarding the degree of returns to scale of R&D. In our
model with advertising, we are able to replicate empirical patterns in the data (e.g., devi-
ations from Gibrat’s law, and decreasing R&D and advertising intensities across firm sizes)
when there exist constant, and even increasing, returns to scale in R&D. Our formulation
of advertising, which relies on empirical evidence from the marketing literature, delivers as
an equilibrium outcome that smaller firms are more concerned with innovation even when
technological advantages in innovation might not be particularly tailored toward them. This
is because those firms are the ones that marginally benefit the most in terms of increased
advertising efficiency from an increase in the size of their portfolio of products. This is a
novel explanation that highlights the potential effects of firms’ advertising on firm growth,
and it can have significant implications in terms of aggregate growth as well as policy as
discussed in Section 7.25
Improving Extrinsic Quality (φ) Besides building upon the intrinsic quality com-
ponent of their products, firms can undertake advertising expenditures in order to enhance
quality on the extrinsic dimension. Specifically, for a firm of size n ≥ 1 with a portfolio of
intrinsic qualities q, we assume the following function for advertising effectiveness on good
j ∈ Jf :
φj = θ˜jm
ζ
jn
η (3)
where mj is the expenditure into advertising good j, with (ζ, η) ∈ R2+, and θ˜j is a
good- and firm-specific efficiency component, defined by θ˜j ≡ θ qjQq Q¯1−ζ . The object Qq ≡(∑
qj′∈q q
1/α
j′
)α
is a within-firm measure of aggregate intrinsic quality, and θ ≥ 0 is the
component of advertising efficiency that is constant across time, goods and firms.
Equation (3) embodies some of the main effects of advertising identified by the marketing
literature reviewed in Section 2 that are necessary within our framework to confirm the four
main empirical facts listed in Section 3.
First, everything else equal, the return to advertising a good j is increasing in advertising
expenditures on that same good (mj), where the parameter ζ > 0 controls the elasticity of
advertising returns to advertising expenditure. To discipline this parameter, we rely on ample
evidence in Marketing establishing diminishing returns to advertising expenditures (Simon
and Arndt (1980), Sutton (1991), Jones (1995) and Bagwell (2007)), and thus assume that
ζ < 1. This concavity assumption in the advertising function is also standard in economic
models with marketing, e.g. Stigler (1961), Arkolakis (2010) and Dinlersoz and Yorukoglu
(2012).26
Second, the marketing return increases in the object qj/Qq, which is a measure of the
relative quality of the good within the firm. That is, advertising is more effective for goods
25In Appendix G.1, we extend our baseline model with a theory of patent citations following Akcigit and Kerr
(2018). Our model can deliver two other empirical regularities i.e. smaller firms tend to produce relatively more
patents and those patents tend to be of higher quality.
26In addition, effectiveness is also concave in aggregate quality Q¯ to ensure the existence of a balanced growth
path.
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that are intrinsically of relatively higher quality compared to other products in the firm.
This implies that, in equilibrium, firms spend relatively more on advertising higher intrinsic
quality products, a result that has been identified empirically by the marketing literature
(e.g. Archibald et al. (1983), Caves and Greene (1996), Marquardt and McGann (1975),
Rotfeld and Rotzoll (1976), Bagwell (2007) and Kirmani and Rao (2000)).
Third, and critically for our mechanism, larger firms have an absolute marketing advan-
tage over smaller firms in that, everything else equal, the return to advertising is greater for
higher n (η > 0). We interpret this as there being spillover effects within the firm. This effect
is meant to capture the value of firm branding, as it is reminiscent of the “umbrella brand-
ing” effect discussed in the empirical marketing literature (e.g. Lane and Jacobson (1995),
Tauber (1981, 1988), Rangaswamy et al. (1993), Smith and Park (1992), Balachander and
Ghose (2003), Erdem (1998) and Erdem and Sun (2002)).
4.3 Entry and Exit, Pricing and Resource Constraints
There is no exogenous exit, and firms move endogenously on the size distribution in a
step-wise fashion via the external innovation margin. Creative destruction occurs whenever
a good is taken over by a successful external innovator, and a firm exits when it loses its last
remaining product.
We assume that a firm produces a good if it possesses a technological leadership on it.
The last innovator in each product line then owns the leading patent and has monopolistic
power until it is displaced by another firm. Once a firm makes an innovation, it acquires a
perpetual patent on it. However, this patent does not preclude other firms from investing into
research to improve the intrinsic quality of the product. As it is standard in the literature,
we assume that the new innovator is able to price the old incumbent out of the market and
charge the unconstrained monopoly price.
The economy is closed so GDP equals aggregate consumption plus aggregate investment.
The latter is split between aggregate R&D expenditure by entrants and incumbents, de-
noted Zt, and aggregate advertising expenditure by incumbents, denoted Mt. The resource
constraint at time t is
Ct + Zt +Mt ≤ Yt (4)
Finally, the labor market must clear. Labor demand comes from intermediate goods
producers only, and therefore feasibility requires that
∫ 1
0 ljtdj ≤ 1 for all t ∈ R+.
4.4 Equilibrium
In this section we derive the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the economy. Later on, we
specialize the equilibrium to a balanced-growth path (BGP) in which all aggregates grow at
a constant and positive rate, g.
Consumer’s Problem Taking initial wealth A0 as given, the representative consumer
chooses a path for consumption to maximize utility subject to the flow budget constraint and∫ t
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a no-Ponzi condition, limt→+∞ e−
∫ t
0 rsdsAt ≥ 0. The optimality condition yields the standard
Euler equation for consumption:
C˙t
Ct
= rt − ρ (5)
Intermediate-good firms are owned by the household, so the value of household wealth
is equal to the value of corporate assets. Namely, At =
∫
F V (qf )df , where V (qf ) denotes
the net present value of the whole future expected stream of profits for a monopolist f who
owns the (intrinsic) quality portfolio qf at time t. In equilibrium, the following transversality
condition holds:
lim
t→+∞
[
e−
∫ t
0 rsds
∫
F
Vt(qf )df
]
= 0 (6)
Final Good Firm’s Problem The representative final good producer takes qualities
{q˜j : j ∈ [0, 1]} and input prices {pj : j ∈ [0, 1]} as given and chooses intermediate goods
{yjt : j ∈ [0, 1]} to maximize profits. This leads to:
pjt =
(
q˜jt
yjt
)β
(7)
Recalling that q˜jt = qjt(1 + djt), Equation (7) says that the inverse demand function for
goods is iso-elastic, and β is the price-elasticity. Importantly, this demand function makes
apparent that advertising, by increasing total quality (q˜jt = qjt + φjt) through its extrinsic
component (φjt = qjtdjt), effectively impacts consumer preferences, and works as a demand
shifter that alters consumption decisions.27
Incumbent Firm’s Problem A monopolist chooses labor, quantities, prices, R&D and
advertising expenditures over each good in its portfolio in order to maximize the present
discounted value of the total future stream of profits. Our set-up allows us to break this
problem into a static part, in which the firm sets price, quantity and advertising expenditures
over the goods that it currently owns, and a dynamic part, in which R&D decisions are made.
Before the R&D and advertising choices, the static maximization problem of monopolist
j ∈ [0, 1] holding the patent for the leading-edge intrinsic quality of good j is:
π(q˜jt) = max
yjt
{
pjtyjt − wtljt
}
s.t. yjt = Q¯tljt and pjt = q˜
β
jty
−β
jt
where π stands for operating profits before advertising and R&D expenditures. The
27In Appendix G.2.5, we present an extension of the model in which advertising also affect the price-elasticity of
demand.
optimality condition implies pjt =
(
1
1−β
)
wt
Q¯t
, meaning that all monopolists set the same price
every period, or pjt = pt, ∀j. This price is the optimal unconstrained monopoly solution: a
constant markup over the marginal cost. Using labor market clearing,
∫ 1
0 ljtdj = 1, we can
find the market-clearing wage wt = (1 − β)
[
Q¯t + Φ¯t
]β
Q¯1−βt , where Φ¯t ≡
∫ 1
0 φjtdj denotes
aggregate extrinsic quality. The monopoly price can thus be written as:
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pt =
(
Q¯t + Φ¯t
Q¯t
)β
(8)
Aggregate output is:
Yt =
1− β
β
[
Q¯t + Φ¯t
]β
Q¯1−βt (9)
and flow operating profits before advertising costs can be written as:
πjt = π˜tq˜jt (10)
where
π˜t = β
(
Q¯t
Q¯t + Φ¯t
)1−β
(11)
is the component of profits that is constant across goods. Equation (10) shows that any
difference in flow profits across goods must be due to differences in either intrinsic or extrinsic
quality, or both. Therefore, R&D and advertising represent two non-mutually exclusive ways
to increase profits. From Equation (11), we can notice that the profit of a firm is a decreasing
function of the overall investment in advertising in the economy through Φ¯t.
Advertising Choices Henceforth, we drop time subscripts unless otherwise needed.
When choosing advertising expenditures (mj), a firm of size n and portfolio of (intrinsic)
qualities q ∈ Rn+ solves the static problem:
πadv ≡ max
{mj :j∈J}
∑
qj∈q
[
π˜(qj + φ(mj , n))−mj
]
(12)
s.t. φ(mj , n) = θ
qj(∑
qj′∈q q
1/α
j′
)α Q¯1−ζmζjnη
where πadv denotes flow profits after the advertising decision. We make the assumption
that α = 1 − ζ in order to reduce the dimensionality of the parameter space and be able
to find closed-form expressions.28 The optimality condition gives good-specific advertising
28Our results would not be qualitatively affected by the choice of a different value of α because the main
mechanism regarding advertising and R&D intensity works through firm size n. In addition, this assumption
implies a positive relationship between advertising expenditure and quality at the product level but not at the
firm level. This is in line with empirical results in Archibald et al. (1983) who study this relationship at both the
product and brand level. A similar result is obtained in Caves and Greene (1996) at the brand level.
expenditures of
and thus firm-level advertising expenditures of
Mn ≡
∑
qj∈qf
mj =
(
ζθπ˜
) 1
1−ζ Q¯n
η
1−ζ (14)
mj =
(
ζθπ˜
) 1
1−ζ
q
1/(1−ζ)
j∑
j′ q
1/(1−ζ)
j′
Q¯n
η
1−ζ (13)
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for a firm of size n. Recall from our empirical analysis that (i) advertising expenditures
are increasing in size, and (ii) advertising intensity is decreasing in size (Fact #3). The first
observation is delivered directly by the fact that η > 0. Defining advertising intensity by
Mn/n, in order to satisfy the second requirement it must be that Mn is concave in n. This
leads to the following parametric restriction: η1−ζ < 1.
Because we imposed diminishing returns to advertising (ζ < 1), the empirically-informed
parameter restriction directly implies that η < 1. Since this parameter controls for the
degree of size spillovers coming from advertising (recall Equation (3)), we obtain that, in
order to replicate the decreasing advertising intensity, the spillover effect from size must be
marginally stronger for smaller firms. Namely, the gain in advertising return for an n-to-
(n+ 1) transition is higher when n is smaller. As a consequence, smaller firms are relatively
more concerned with expanding to new product markets, and they choose a relatively higher
external innovation intensity in equilibrium.
In sum, the mechanism implies that the interaction between R&D and advertising can
generate a decreasing R&D intensity with firm size (Fact #2) and hence a deviation from
Gibrat’s law (Fact #1). Our model can then qualitatively generate Facts 1 to 3 even in the
presence of non-decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
Combining returns and costs, we have that the overall static profits of the firm are
πadv = π˜
∑
qj∈q qj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intrinsic
profits
+ γQ¯n
η
1−ζ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Extrinsic
profits
(15)
where γ ≡ π˜γ˜ − (θπ˜ζ) 11−ζ is constant across goods and firms. Equation (15) is the
static value of firm-level flow operating profits net of advertising expenditures. It has two
components. The first one grows linearly with the aggregate intrinsic quality within the
firm, with a factor of proportionality that does not vary across firms (although it typically
may grow with the economy). The second one is invariant to the firm’s intrinsic quality
portfolio, but is increasing and concave in firm size. This component comes from investment
in advertising and the extrinsic margin of product quality. While the first term is standard in
models of endogenous firm growth with scalable returns, the second term is new and critically
alters the dynamic incentives to conduct research vis-a`-vis advertising in the way that we
have described above.
BGP Equilibrium Characterization A Balanced Growth Path equilibrium is defined
as an equilibrium allocation in which aggregate variables grow at a constant rate, denoted by
g > 0. To show the existence of such an equilibrium, we make use of the fact that economy-
wide extrinsic quality Φ¯ in fact grows at the same rate as that of aggregate intrinsic quality.
Formally, we have that Φ¯ = Φ∗Q¯ where Φ∗ is a constant, both across time and firms. Under
this result, it is clear from Equation (9) that, if a BGP exists where output grows at the rate
g, then g = ˙¯Q/Q¯. Moreover, we can note from Equation (11) that π˜ is time-invariant, and
therefore flow operating profits before advertising costs can be written as πjt = πq˜jt in BGP,
where π = β(1 + Φ∗)β−1 is a constant. In turn, γ is then constant, and Φ¯ becomes a linear
function of Q¯.
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By construction, we can express total aggregate extrinsic quality on the BGP as Φ¯ =∑+∞
n=1 FμnΦn, where μn is the invariant share of size-n firms (which we derive explicitly
below), such that μn ∈ [0, 1] and
∑+∞
n=1 μn = 1. Combining Φ¯ = Φ
∗Q¯ with the formula for
Φ¯ and the equilibrium firm-level extrinsic quality, we then obtain that Φ∗ is the solution to
the following expression:
Φ∗ = θ
1
1−ζ
(
ζβ
(1 + Φ∗)1−β
) ζ
1−ζ +∞∑
n=1
Fμnn
η
1−ζ (16)
Equation (16) delivers a unique solution Φ∗ > 0. A direct consequence of the result is
that aggregate marketing expenditures, M , grow at the rate g, since M =
∑+∞
n=1 FμnMn,
and Mn has been shown to be linear in Q¯ (Equation (14)). In particular, we obtain
M =
+∞∑
n=1
Fμn
(
ζθπ˜
) 1
1−ζ n
η
1−ζ Q¯ (17)
and thus M˙/M = g. From the resource constraint in (4), if total R&D expenditures Z
grow at the rate of Q¯ (a result whose proof we relegate to the end of this section), so does
aggregate consumption, C. From Equation (5), we then have that g = rt − ρ, and therefore
rt = r = g + ρ, ∀t.
Value Functions We now describe the R&D choices of firms. Denote by τ the endogenous
rate of creative destruction along the BGP, and by xn the external R&D intensity of a firm of
size n, i.e. xn ≡ Xn/n, where Xn is the Poisson rate of external innovation. Taking (r, τ, g)
as given, a firm f with a product portfolio with 1 ≤ n = |qf | goods chooses external R&D
intensity xn, and internal R&D intensities {zj : j ∈ Jf}, to maximize firm value Vn(qf ),
written in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman form (see Appendix A.1 for a derivation):
rVn(qf ) = max
xn,{zj}
{ ∑
qj∈qf
[
π˜qj − χ̂zψ̂j qj + zj
(
Vn
(
qf\−{qj} ∪+ {qj(1 + λI)}
)− Vn(qf ))
+ τ
(
Vn−1
(
qf\−{qj}
)− Vn(qf ))
]
+ nxn
(∫ 1
0
Vn+1
(
qf ∪+ {qj(1 + λE)}
)
dj − Vn(qf )
)
− χ˜nσ+ψ˜xψ˜Q¯+ γQ¯n η1−ζ
}
+ V˙n(qf ) (18)
subject to Equation (3), where ∪+ and \− are multiset union and difference operators.29
The first two terms in the first line of Equation (18) are good-specific intrinsic flow operating
profits net of internal R&D costs. The third term in the first line is the change in value due
to the internal improvement over a currently held good. This event occurs at a Poisson flow
rate of zj , and it increases the intrinsic quality of the good by a factor of (1 + λ
I) > 1. The
first term in the second line is the change in the firm’s value when losing a good j to another
29These operators are defined by {a, b} ∪+ {b} = {a, b, b}, and {a, b, b}\−{b} = {a, b}, and they are needed
because the set qf may include more than one instance of the same element.
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incumbent or an outside entrant through creative destruction, an event that occurs at the
equilibrium Poisson rate τ . In this case, the firm becomes of size n− 1. The second term on
this line is the change in value for the firm when it successfully acquires a new product line
through external innovation and transitions to n + 1, which occurs at the Poisson rate nxn
(recall that here xn denotes the intensity rate). The third line includes the flow resources
spent in external R&D, extrinsic flow profits (recall equation (15)), and the instantaneous
change in firm value due to economic growth.
As for entrants, their value function is given by the following equation (see Appendix A
for a derivation):
rV0 = max
xe>0
{
xe
[∫ 1
0
V1({qj(1 + λE)})dj − V0
]
− νxeQ¯
}
+ V˙0 (19)
where V0 denotes firm value at (n,qf ) = (0, ∅). Entrants are choosing the rate of entry xe.
If there is a positive mass of entrants in equilibrium, the free-entry condition reads V0 = 0.
Our first proposition shows that the growth rate of the economy is measured as the
combined contributions of internal and external innovators, advancing aggregate productivity
by λI and λE , respectively.
Proposition 1 (Growth rate) The growth rate of the economy in the BGP equilibrium is
given by
g = τλE + zλI (20)
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Moreover, since innovation rates are independent, the rate of creative destruction τ is
given by the aggregate Poisson rate of external innovation coming from entrants and incum-
bents. Therefore,
τ = xe +
+∞∑
n=1
Fμnnxn (21)
In turn, we can find a closed-form expression the invariant firm size distribution along
the BGP:
Proposition 2 (Invariant firm-size distribution) The invariant firm-size distribution is
given by
μn =
xe
F
∏n−1
i=1 xi
nτn
; ∀n ≥ 1 (22)
with μn ∈ [0, 1], ∀n ≥ 1, and
∑+∞
n=1 μn = 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
We are now ready to solve for the value function and find optimal R&D intensities. To
this purpose, we guess a functional form of the type Vn(qf ) = Γ
∑
qj∈qf qj +ΥnQ¯ for which
+
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we must verify the value of the constant coefficient Γ ∈ R+ and the sequence {Υn}+∞n=1. This
guess is informed by the expression for the flow value of holding a given product, seen in
(15). Namely, a firm derives value from the intrinsic quality of the products it is selling,
independently of its size (the first term, whose coefficient Γ is constant across firm types),
but also from the option value of marketing its goods in order to increase demand and revenue
(the second term, whose coefficient Υn depends on firm type).
30
The following proposition summarizes the solution:
Proposition 3 (Value functions) Assuming that there is positive entry in equilibrium
(xe > 0), the value for a firm of size n ≥ 1 is Vn(qf ) = Γ
∑
qj∈qf qj +ΥnQ¯, where
Γ =
ν −Υ1
1 + λE
(23)
and Υn, for n ≥ 1, is the solution to the second-order difference equation
Υn+1 −Υn + Γ(1 + λE) = ϑ˜
(
ρΥnn
σ
ψ˜−1 − (Υn−1 −Υn)τn
σ+ψ˜−1
ψ˜−1 − γn
η
1−ζ+
σ
ψ˜−1
) ψ˜−1
ψ˜
(24)
30When ψ˜ + σ 
= 1, Υn+1 −Υn also captures the dependence of external R&D on firm size.
where ϑ˜ ≡ ψ˜
(
χ˜
(ψ˜−1)ψ˜−1
) 1
ψ˜ is a parameter, with boundary condition Υ0 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
In the appendix we show that we obtain the following optimal R&D intensities:
zj =
(
λI(ν −Υ1)
ψ̂χ̂(1 + λE)
) 1
ψ̂−1
(25)
xn = n
1−σ−ψ˜
ψ˜−1
(
ν −Υ1 +Υn+1 −Υn
ψ˜χ˜
) 1
ψ˜−1
(26)
for internal and external innovations, respectively, and all n ≥ 1. First, as announced
before, internal R&D intensity is constant across goods (zj = z). Second, n affects external
innovation intensities through two distinct channels: (i) the degree of scalability in external
R&D technology (σ + ψ˜); (ii) the degree of decreasing returns in advertising through the
branding effect (i.e, the values for ζ and η < 1 − ζ). The former channel features both
explicitly in the exponent of the first multiplicative term of (26), and implicitly within the
Υn sequence in (24). The advertising channel, however, only features through Υn. Thus, we
can obtain the desired inverse dependence of innovation expenditures to size as long as the
advertising channel scales weakly enough to compensate any strong scalability coming from
the R&D technology itself. This allows for the possibility of balanced growth in equilibrium
even when there exist increasing returns to scale in external R&D.
For the sake of intuition, let us focus on the case in which there are constant returns
in external R&D (σ + ψ˜ = 1), which shall be the case in our baseline calibration. In the
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absence of the advertising channel (θ = 0), the model is equivalent to that of Klette and
Kortum (2004). In this case, Υn = nΥ for some constant Υ > 0. This implies that the
gain in value from acquiring one additional good (i.e.,Υn+1−Υn) is constant across firm size
and we obtain the theoretical results that (i) external R&D investment scales perfectly with
size, and consequently (ii) firm growth is independent of size (Gibrat’s law). When θ > 0,
however, deviations from Gibrat’s law can occur even when σ + ψ˜ = 1: small firms might
still be more innovation-intensive than large firms because they benefit marginally more in
terms of advertising efficiency gains from the new product lines.
Equilibrium Definition To close the optimality characterization and define an equilib-
rium, it remains to show two conditions that have been stated without proof in the above
discussion.
First, as shown in Appendix A.4, the BGP equilibrium exhibits positive entry (xe > 0)
if the equilibrium condition ν < Υ1 is satisfied (so that Γ > 0). Intuitively, this condition
says that the cost of entry ν is lower than the gain, coming from the profits accrued for the
acquisition of the first product line of the firm. In practice, this condition is always checked
ex-post in our computation.
Second, from (4) and the result that g = ˙¯Q/Q¯ = C˙/C = M˙/M , we need to check that
aggregate R&D expenditure Z grows at the rate g, as well. Using the cost functions for
R&D, we have that:
Z =
(
χ̂zψ̂ +
∞∑
n=1
Fμnχ˜nx
ψ˜
n + νxe
)
Q¯ (27)
The right-hand side includes aggregate R&D expenditures by incumbents attempting in-
ternal innovations, incumbents attempting external innovations, and outside firms attempt-
ing to enter into the market through external R&D, respectively. Indeed, we get that Z is
linear in Q¯, and hence Z˙/Z = g. Aggregate consumption is then computed as the residual
C = Y − Z −M .
We are now ready to define a BGP equilibrium:
Definition 1 (BGP Equilibrium) A Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium is, for all qj ≥ 0,
j ∈ [0, 1], n ∈ Z+, and Q¯ > 0, allocations yj, lj and mj; extrinsic quality φj; aggregates Y ,
C, Z, M , A; a mass of incumbents F ; a constant Γ and a sequence {Υn}+∞n=1; a firm size
distribution μn; prices w, p, and r; and rates g, z, xn, xe, and τ ; such that: (i) given prices,
final good producers maximize profit; (ii) yj (input quantity) and p (input price) solve the
intermediate sector problem and satisfy (8); (iii) mj (expenditure) and φj (effectiveness) solve
the advertising problem and satisfy (13); (iv) innovation flows z (internal for incumbents)
and xn (external for incumbents) solve the innovation problem and satisfy (25) and (26);
(v) μn (the invariant measure of firms) satisfies (22); (vi) xe (entry flow) and F (mass
of incumbent firms) solve the entry problem and satisfy the free-entry condition V0 = 0
and the restriction
∑
n μn = 1; (vii) Γ (the value of a firm’s intrinsic-quality portfolio)
and Υn (the value of owning n products) solve the value function in (18), and satisfy (23)
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and (24), respectively; (viii) g (growth rate) and τ (creative destruction rate) satisfy (20)
and (21), respectively; (ix) aggregates Y (output), M (advertising expenditure), and Z (R&D
investment) satisfy (9), (17), and (27), respectively, and C (consumption) is found residually
via (4); (x) A (household wealth) satisfies A =
∑
n FμnVn and the transversality condition
(6); (xi) r (interest rate) satisfies r = g + ρ, and w (wage) clears the labor market.
5 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model combining the micro data used in Section 3 with
aggregate moments for the U.S. in the period 1980-2015. We use the same sample from Com-
pustat described in Section 3 and seek to match empirical regression coefficients with model-
implied slopes from simulation-based regressions (an indirect inference approach). This cal-
ibration strategy is fairly standard in the endogenous growth and firm dynamics literature.
The novelties are that we use coefficients on advertising regressions to calibrate our theory of
firm growth and, most importantly, that we are able to match the slopes of both firm growth
and R&D intensity regressions without relying on decreasing returns to scale in the R&D
technology. The BGP algorithm is described in Appendix E.
5.1 Calibration Strategy
There are 13 parameters to identify: (ρ, λE , λI , χ˜, ψ˜, χ̂, ψ̂, σ, ν, β, η, ζ, θ). Some of these
parameters are externally identified, with the rest being internally calibrated via our indirect
inference approach.
In our baseline calibration, we impose constant returns to scale in external innovation
(σ = 1 − ψ˜) and assume that no innovation is more radical than the other (λE = λI ≡ λ).
Once again, we do this to isolate the effects of our advertising-R&D interaction on firm growth
in order to show that the spillover effect on advertising is not only able to quantitatively
match advertising intensity slopes, but also the observed deviations from Gibrat’s law and
R&D intensity across sizes, suggesting that those facts do not necessarily constitute evidence
in favor of decreasing returns to scale in R&D. Later on, in the context of our policy analysis
of Section 7, we will compare our baseline calibration with a second calibration without
advertising and with decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
The parameters (ρ, ψ̂, ψ˜, β, ζ) are externally calibrated. We set ρ = 0.02, which approx-
imately corresponds to a discount factor of 97% annually. We impose ψ̂ = ψ˜ = 2, following
Akcigit and Kerr (2018) and prior empirical literature estimating the cost curvature of differ-
ent types of R&D. To find a value for β, we use (7), (8), and (10) to obtain β =
∫ 1
0 πjt dj∫ 1
0 pjtyjt dj
.
Using our Compustat sample described in Section 3, we calculate the corresponding ratio of
average operating income before depreciation to average sales, and set β = 0.1645. Finally,
we set the elasticity of sales to advertising expenditures to ζ = 0.1, which is in line with
estimations from the empirical marketing literature (see Tellis (2009)).
We are left with the parameters (λ, χ˜, χ̂, ν, η, θ), which are determined internally. In
particular, we solve and simulate the economy and find parameter values that match model
moments and simulation-implied regression coefficients to those observed in the data and
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31All firms are assumed to start the same, with qualities q0 = 1. In the event of ties, namely multiple successful
firms drawing the same good over which to perform an external innovation, we assign equal probabilities to each
firm and draw the new monopolist from the corresponding discrete uniform distribution of tied firms.
presented in tables in Section 3. The simulation of the model uses 1,000 firms and discretizes
time to T = 100 periods of length Δt = 0.01.31
We find values for the 6 internally identified parameters by targeting 7 moments for our
period of interest. We target the aggregate firm entry rate from the Business Dynamics
Table 2: Full set of calibrated parameters in baseline estimation (model with advertising
and constant returns to scale in R&D).
Parameter Value Description Source
External
ρ 0.02 Time discount rate Standard
ψ 2 Elasticity of R&D Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
β 0.1645 Profitability ratio Compustat
ζ 0.1 Sales-ADV elasticity Tellis (2009)
σ 1− ψ Constant RTS in R&D Assumption
Internal
λ 0.0143 Innovation step .
χ̂ 0.0017 Internal R&D scale param. .
χ˜ 0.6256 External R&D scale param. .
ν 0.7206 Entrant’s R&D scale param. .
η 0.8527 ADV spillover effect .
θ 1.1022 ADV efficiency .
Statistics (BDS) data of the U.S. Census Bureau,32 the long-run average growth rate of per
capita GDP in the U.S., and the average ratios of R&D-to-sales and R&D-to-advertising
expenditures from our sample of Compustat firms.33 In addition, we run simulation-based
regressions to target the 4 empirical coefficients of interest that relate to the empirical facts
presented in the full specifications of Section 3: the Gibrat’s law coefficient (column (1) in
Table 1), the R&D intensity and advertising intensity coefficients (column (2) and (3) in Table
1, respectively), and the R&D-to-advertising coefficient (column (4) in Table 1).34 To obtain
these simulation-based results, we compute the corresponding coefficients via OLS and take
the time-series average of the corresponding coefficients.35 Throughout, we use sales as our
measure of size.36 Our selection criterion is a simple unweighted minimum absolute-distance
estimator.37
32Data available at http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data.html.
33For comparison, the average advertising to sales ratio in the data is about 5%.
34Note that the coefficient on the R&D-to-advertising substitution across sizes can be obtained as the difference
between the coefficients on R&D and advertising intensities.
35To allow for convergence of the simulation, we ignore the first 20% of simulations in our calculations.
36In the model, size is measured by the number of products. Since we don’t have data about the number of
products, we rely on sales in our calibration. A number of studies find a positive correlation between sales and the
number of products (see for instance, Scherer (1983), Katila and Ahuja (2002) and Plehn-Dujowich (2013)).
37In particular, we find the minimum of
∑k
m=1
∣∣∣Model(m)−Data(m)Data(m) ∣∣∣, where k is the total number of targeted
moments.
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Table 2 shows the full set of calibrated parameter values. Table 3 shows the results for our
targeted moments, compared to the values in the data. We do well on all targeted moments.
Particularly, all four simulation-based slopes have the correct sign and magnitude. Even
though there are constant returns to scale in the R&D cost function, the spillover effect in
advertising, which is set to target the decreasing advertising intensity with size observed in
the data, is also able to correctly predict both the decreasing R&D intensity and the deviation
from constant firm growth. This implies that the observed decreasing R&D intensity in firm
size observed in the data is not necessarily evidence for the existence of decreasing returns
to scale in R&D. Our calibration shows that it could simply be the result of the interaction
between R&D and advertising even when there exist constant returns to scale in R&D. As
we will argue in Section 7, this aspect can have important policy implications regarding the
optimal design of R&D subsidies.
Importantly, the R&D size dependence comes from the interaction between advertising
and external R&D only. Our model predicts that 64.45% of growth comes from internal
R&D, which is in line with estimates in Garcia-Macia et al. (2016).
Moment Model Data Data Source
Aggregate moments
Average growth rate g 0.02 0.02 Standard
Firm entry rate xe/F 0.101 0.098 BDS
Average R&D-Sales ratio
∑
n FμnRn/(py) 0.153 0.102 Compustat
Average R&D-ADV ratio
∑
n FμnRn/Mn 24.15 26.40 Compustat
Regression coefficients
Gibrat’s coefficient βΔsales/sales -0.0326 -0.0325 Table 1
R&D intensity coefficient βrd/sales -0.1030 -0.1035 Table 1
ADV intensity coefficient βadv/sales -0.0353 -0.0317 Table 1
R&D/ADV coefficient βrd/adv -0.0677 -0.0719 Table 1
Notes: Sales are used as the measure of firm size. Rn stands for the total R&D expenditures
of a firm of size n, defined in Equation (2). Mn is total advertising expenditures at the firm
level, defined in Equation (14).
Table 3: Targeted moments: model vs. data. Model with advertising and constant returns
to scale in R&D.
5.2 Growth Effects of Advertising
In this section, we study the effect of a decrease in advertising cost (equivalently, an
increase in θ) on the growth rate of the economy. (We relegate the implications for welfare
to Appendix B.) Specifically, we show that in our calibrated model R&D and advertising
act as substitutes at the firm level. This implies that more efficient advertising can have a
detrimental effect on growth by decreasing the rate of innovation in the economy. This is
ultimately a quantitative result. Indeed, in Appendix F we show that R&D and advertising
can be either complements or substitutes at both the firm and aggregate level depending on
parameter values.38
38We further show in Appendix F that our model can generate decreasing R&D intensity with firm size even
in the presence of increasing returns to scale in R&D. The possible existence of an equilibrium when there exist
increasing returns in R&D is an interesting feature of our model.
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Interestingly, even when R&D and advertising are substitutes, the effects of advertising
efficiency on growth is ambiguous. To see this, we can decompose the growth rate of the
economy in the model by combining (20) and (21) to obtain:
g = λExe︸ ︷︷ ︸
Entrants
+ zλI︸︷︷︸
Incumbents
doing internal
+λE
+∞∑
n=1
Fμnnxn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Incumbents
doing external
(28)
The three additive terms in g correspond to the contribution to growth by entrants, incum-
bents performing internal improvements, and incumbents performing external innovations,
respectively. In addition, there is a compositional effect coming from shifts in the distribu-
tion of firm, Fμn. Since firms of different size have different R&D investment behavior, this
compositional channel might also affect the rate of growth of the economy.
intensity when advertising becomes more efficient. This decrease is even more pronounced
for larger firms. Finally, there is a compositional effect operating through changes in the firm
size distribution. As a result of higher entry rate and lower external innovation by incumbent,
the firm size distribution shifts to the left (Figure 3). This places more mass on the part of
Figure 2: Growth decomposition, for different values of advertising efficiency (θ), in the
calibrated economy. The calibrated value of θ is marked by the dashed vertical line. The
growth rate is g = τλE + zλI , where τ = xe +
∑+∞
n=1 Fμnnxn is the creative destruction
rate. The entry rate is measured by xe/F .
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We plot these different effects against advertising efficiency (θ) in Figures 2 and 3. On
the one hand, when advertising becomes more efficient (higher θ), the value of becoming
an incumbent firm increases, which fosters new entry of new firms. The increased R&D
investment by entrants has a positive effect on innovation and economic growth. It also
increases the rate of creative destruction which modifies the incentive to perform internal
R&D. On the other hand, a higher creative destruction rate implies that firms are now more
likely to lose one of their products by being displaced by another firm. As a result, firms
have smaller incentives to perform internal R&D. This decrease in internal R&D investment
depresses economic growth. Moreover, incumbent firms also decrease their external R&D
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the firm distribution that is most R&D intensive. This compositional channel thus tends to
foster growth.
Overall, the decrease in internal and external R&D investment more than offset the
increase in the entry rate and the compositional shift in the firm size distribution, and the
growth rate ends up decreasing when advertising efficiency goes up. Within our calibrated
economy, we find that these detrimental effects can be substantial. In particular, growth
would increase by 0.64 percentage points (from its calibrated value of 2% to 2.64%) if the
advertising sector was to be shut down completely (namely, if θ changed from its calibrated
value of θ = 1.1022 to θ = 0).
Figure 3: Change in firm size distribution as a function of advertising efficiency (θ).
6 Validation Exercises
Our set of validation exercises are made of two parts. First, we compare untargeted
moments in our model and in the data. Second, we test empirically the R&D-advertising
substitution predicted by our calibrated model.
6.1 Untargeted Moments
The first set of untargeted moments that we consider is the variance of firm growth, R&D
and advertising intensities across firm size. It is a well-known stylized fact in the literature
that not only the average but also the variance of firm growth rates decreases with firm
size (see among others Hymer and Pashigian (1962), Evans (1987) and Klette and Kortum
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 100
5
10
15
20
25
Size (n)
%
 o
f f
irm
s
Firm size distribution
 
 
θ=1.1 (calib.)
θ=0.3
(2004)). In Figure 4, we compare the evolution of these variances in the model and in the
data.
Our model fits the relationship between the variance of firm growth and firm size well. In
addition, we also report the standard deviation of R&D and advertising intensity with firm
size. Figure 4 shows that these standard deviations are also decreasing with firm size in the
data. Our model predicts a decrease in the variance in R&D and advertising intensity which
is both qualitatively and quantitatively (broadly) in line with the data even though these
moments were not targeted in our estimation.
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In Table 4, we compare additional untargeted moments. The correlation coefficients
between R&D intensity and firm (sale) growth as well as between advertising intensity and
firm growth predicted by the model are broadly in line with those in the data. Our model
also predicts high levels of serial correlation in R&D and advertising intensity within firms
which are comparable to their empirical counterparts. The ratio of R&D to advertising
expenditures is also very persistent both in the model and in the data.
6.2 Empirical Test of the R&D-Advertising Substitution
While our theoretical model could potentially generate complementarity between R&D
and advertising (see Appendix F), the calibrated version of the model predicts substitutabil-
ity. In this section, we provide empirical evidence for the crowding out between advertising
and R&D.
1 2 3 4 50
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Size quintile
St. Dev. growth (1st quintile = 1)
 
 
Data
Model
1 2 3 4 50.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Size quintile
St. Dev. R&D intensity (1st quintile = 1)
1 2 3 4 50.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Size quintile
St. Dev. ADV intensity (1st quintile = 1)
Notes: Firms are ranked in size quintiles according to their normalized level of sales (sales
as a ratio of average sales in the same year). R&D and advertising intensities are measured
as the ratio of total R&D and advertising expenditures to total sales within each group. The
standard deviation in the first quintile is normalized to one.
Figure 4: Standard deviations (relative to 1st quintile): Model vs. Data.
Notes: R&D and advertising intensity in logarithm.
DATA MODEL
corr(R&D intensity, firm growth) 0.15 0.25
corr(ADV intensity, firm growth) 0.10 0.22
autocorr(R&D intensity) 0.92 0.89
autocorr(ADV intensity) 0.88 0.76
autocorr(R&D/ADV ratio) 0.92 0.92
Table 4: Correlation and Autocorrelation Coefficients: Model vs. Data.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 35 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
39Since 1981, an R&D tax credit has also been implemented at the federal level (with the exception of 1995).
We use it for computing a measure of the R&D user costs.
40We use data for all 50 U.S. states as well as for the District of Columbia. When states have several credit
brackets, we use the top marginal rate.
41This includes operation expenses not directly related to production such as accounting, advertising, delivery,
directors’ remuneration, engineering, marketing, legal expenses or R&D.
To test for the existence of substitution between R&D and advertising expenditure, we use
exogenous variation in the cost of R&D over time and across U.S. states. In the early 1980s,
U.S. states started implementing tax incentives for innovation. Starting with the state of
Minnesota in 1982, several U.S. states subsequently introduced R&D tax incentives to stim-
ulate innovation. These tax incentives are typically in the form of tax credits, corresponding
to a certain share of R&D expenditures, which can be deducted from state corporate income
tax. The inception date of the tax varies across states. The tax credit rate also varies across
states and over time within each state. This allows us to obtain exogenous variation in the
relative price of R&D over time and across states. In 2009, 32 states offered such credits
with rates varying between 2% and 20%.39
We use annual data from Compustat on R&D, advertising, sales, and our measures of
firm age and financial constraints from Section 3, for the period 1950 - 2009. We also retrieve
data on the relevant state for tax credit from Compustat. We focus our analysis on firms
reporting positive advertising and R&D expenditures. Data on tax credit rates are obtained
from Wilson (2009) and Falato and Sim (2014).40
To provide evidence for substitution between R&D and advertising, we show that a de-
crease in the relative price of R&D (through an increase in R&D tax credits) leads to a
significant decrease in advertising intensity. We perform the following firm-level regressions:
log
(
Adviszt
Salesiszt
)
= α0 + β1 Tax Creditst + β2Xist + αt + αs + αz + uiszt (29)
for firm i in state s and industry z at time t, where αt, αz and αs control for time, industry
and state fixed effects respectively, Tax Creditjt is a measure of R&D tax credit and Xist is
a vector of control variables including sales, the age of the firm, the level of equity financing,
state corporate tax rates, and selling, general and administrative expense.41
Regression results are reported in Table 5. Column (1) reports the results from regressing
advertising intensity on a dummy variable which takes value one if the state has a tax credit
implemented at time t. The results show a negative correlation between the existence of
an R&D tax credit and the level of advertising intensity in the state, conforming with our
mechanism.
Using this specification, however, ignores differences in the tax credit rate between states
and over time. To amend this issue, columns (2) to (5) use different measures of tax credit
rate and R&D relative cost in order to take into account the magnitude of the credit. Column
(2) shows a significantly negative relationship between advertising intensity and the relative
price of R&D using changes in the statutory tax credit across states and time. In particular,
a one-percentage-point increase in the statutory state R&D tax credit is associated with a
1.75% decrease in advertising expenditures. In column (3), we use a tax-adjusted credit
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42A full description of the measures of R&D costs is reported in Appendix H.1.
Notes: Data from Compustat from 1950 to 2009, Wilson (2009) and Falato and Sim (2014).
Controls include sales (logarithm), age, financial constraint, state tax and selling, general
and administrative expense (logarithm). Firm age is measured as the elapsed time since the
first observation in the data. Our measure of financial constraints is sale minus purchases
of common and preferred stock, divided by sales. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level (in parentheses).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
Tax credit -0.0629
dummy (0.0369)
State credit -1.748
rate (0.582)
Tax-adjusted -1.753
state rate (0.627)
Effective -1.901
state rate (0.608)
R&D 1.823
user cost (0.678)
Controls     
Time FE     
Industry FE     
State FE     
Observations 28743 27455 27455 25333 25333
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.43
Table 5: Effect of R&D subsidy on advertising intensity at the firm level
1.75% decrease in advertising expenditures. In column (3), we use a tax-adjusted credit
rate.42 Column (4), in turn, uses an alternative measure of the marginal effective R&D
tax credit which acknowledges the different definitions of the R&D expenditures which are
eligible for tax credit as well as the horizon over which the tax credit is calculated.
As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 5, using the tax-adjusted and marginal effective
subsidy rate confirms the negative relationship between advertising intensity and R&D sub-
sidy. Finally, we use one additional state-level measure of the cost of R&D: R&D user cost.
Column (5) of Table 5 shows that higher R&D user costs are also associated with higher
levels of advertising intensity, as expected if R&D and advertising are substitutes.43
Interestingly, R&D seems to be a complement to other types of expenditures at the firm
level. In Appendix C, we show that a lower cost of R&D is associated with higher levels of
selling, general and administrative expenses (excluding R&D and Advertising).
7 Policy Implications
We now present potential policy implications of our model. First, since we have showed
that advertising can be detrimental to growth and welfare, we analyze the possibility of a tax
on advertising.44 Second, we have proposed a new explanation for the observed decreasing
43In Appendix H.2, we provide state-level evidence for substitutability between R&D and advertising.
44The idea of taxing advertising has been discussed before, for instance in Solow (1968).
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R&D intensity with firm size as the result from the optimal allocation of resources between
R&D and advertising at the firm level. Our second policy exercise compares the effectiveness
of R&D subsidies under our baseline calibration versus a world with technological differences
in R&D production function.
7.1 Advertising Tax
We introduce a tax on advertising expenditure along the BGP. The firm’s optimal adver-
tising choice maximizes:
max
{mj}
∑
j
[
π˜ · (qj + qjdj)− (1 + ξ)mj
]
s.t. qjdj = θjm
ζ
jn
η
where ξ ≥ 0 is the tax rate. Namely, for every unit of expenditure in advertising, the firm
must pay an additional cost of ξ. Proceeds of the tax are rebated lump-sum to households.
Figure 5 plots, for different levels of the tax, the percentage change (with respect to
ξ = 0) in the growth, entry, internal and external innovation rates (the latter for firms of
different size n) of the calibrated economy. We observe that the advertising tax is equivalent
to a decrease in advertising efficiency, which increases the growth rate of the economy.45
However, the tax is considerably ineffective in the sense that the change in growth is small.
The elasticity of sales to advertising expenditure is low, which implies that firms’ response
to the change in the advertising cost from higher tax rates is timid. In particular, they only
very modestly substitute advertising spending for R&D spending, and overall the economy’s
growth rate responds very little. The advertising tax also deters entry which tends to decrease
growth.
Overall, we find that even though the advertising sector is detrimental to growth, taxation
has limited effective power. For instance, a 0.1 percentage-point increase in g would require
45In particular, θpost−tax ≡ θpre−tax(1 + ξ)−ζ , inside γ (see Equation (15)).
Figure 5: Percentage change (with respect to ξ = 0) in growth, entry, creative destruction
and internal innovation rates of the calibrated economy, for different sizes of the advertising
tax rate.
a tax rate around 910%.
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1−3
−2
−1
0
%
 C
ha
ng
e
Entry rate (% Change)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
1
2
3
%
 c
ha
ng
e
Internal Innovation (% Change)
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Tax (ξ)
%
 c
ha
ng
e
External Innovation (% Change)
 
 
n=1 n=5 n=10
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10
0.5
1
1.5
2
Tax (ξ)
%
 c
ha
ng
e
Growth rate (% Change)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
46The inefficiency in Schumpeterian models arising from a business-stealing effect is usually shown to be domi-
nated by positive externalities. See for instance Jones and Williams (2000), Alvarez-Pelaez and Groth (2005) and
Bloom et al. (2013).
7.2 R&D Subsidies
Next, we analyze the effect of R&D subsidies with and without the presence of advertising.
A study of this type of industrial policy in the context of an endogenous growth model of firm
dynamics is not new to our work. Akcigit (2009) and Acemoglu et al. (2018), among others,
find that R&D subsidies may increase growth, particularly when targeted toward entrants
and small incumbent innovative-intensive firms. This policy scheme is typically welfare-
improving because it has the potential of correcting for inefficiencies stemming from R&D:
namely, in the decentralized equilibrium, firms fail to appropriate the full social value of their
innovations, as they do not internalize that their current innovations will be embedded within
the goods that will be passed on to other firms in the future through creative destruction.46
Unfortunately, analytically solving for the social planner’s allocation in order to study optimal
taxation is famously hard within this class of models, and beyond the scope of this paper.
In our calibrated economy, advertising poses a second source of distortions, as it impedes
the economy from reaching its full growth potential by altering innovation decisions. Here,
we intend to explore the implications of a subsidy on R&D, when the advertising channel
provides the necessary spillover effect to explain the deviation from Gibrat’s law seen in the
data. We then compare this baseline economy to another one in which there are decreasing
returns to scale in R&D and no advertising.
Parameter Value Description
λ 0.0226 Innovation step
χ̂ 0.0119 Internal R&D scale param.
χ˜ 3.2280 External R&D scale param.
ν 1.2351 Entrant’s R&D scale param.
σ -0.9411 Degree of DRTS in R&D
Implied ψ˜ + σ 1.0589
Calibration Without Advertising and DRTS in R&D We compare two subsi-
dized economies. The first economy corresponds to our baseline calibration of Section 5.1, in
which the spillover effect on advertising is active and there exist constant returns to scale in
R&D. The second economy corresponds to a calibration of the model in which advertising
is shut down (e.g. θ = 0) and returns to R&D need not scale proportionally with firm size.
In this new specification, we have 2 fewer parameters to estimate, and 5 as opposed to 7
moments to target (the same moments, except those related to advertising).
Table 6: Internally calibrated parameters in the model without advertising and with de-
creasing returns to scale in R&D.
Table 6 presents the internally-identified parameter values for the calibrated model with-
out advertising.47 As expected, absent the advertising channel, we need decreasing returns
47As in the baseline calibration, we externally set ρ = 0.02, ψ = 2 and β = 0.1645.
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to scale in R&D (i.e., ψ+ σ > 1) in order to match the deviations from constant growth and
R&D intensity. In particular, we find σ = −0.9411 < 1 (so that ψ˜ + σ = 1.0589).48
Comparing Calibrations Before comparing the effectiveness of R&D subsidies in the
two different calibrations, we compare their performance in terms of calibrated and uncal-
ibrated moments. We show that, on several dimensions, the model with advertising more
closely matches empirical features of the data compared to the model with DRTS in R&D.
Table 7 presents the performance of the calibrated model without advertising in terms
of moment matching, next to the results from the baseline calibration with advertising that
we presented before in Table 3. First, the model without advertising has a harder time
quantitatively explaining both deviations from constant R&D intensity and Gibrat’s law
jointly. In contrast, the baseline calibration of Section 5.1 with advertising spillover effects
and constant returns in R&D was not only able to closely match both of these deviations,
but also the advertising regression coefficient.
In Figure 6, we report the relationship between the standard deviation of firm growth
with R&D intensity and firm size. We can notice that the model with advertising matches
the evolution of those standard deviations more closely than the model without advertising.
Even though the model without advertising correctly predicts that the standard deviation
, y ρ , ψ β
48This implies that a 10-product firm would find it 14.5% more expensive to grow by a given rate than it would
be for 10 firms of one product each.
Notes: Sales are used as the measure of firm size. Rn stands for the total R&D expenditures
of a firm of size n, defined in Equation (2). Mn is total advertising expenditures at the firm
level, defined in Equation (14).
Moment Model Model Data Data
with ADV without ADV Source
Aggregate moments
Average growth rate g 0.02 0.02 0.02 Standard
Firm entry rate xe/F 0.101 0.092 0.098 BDS
Average R&D/Sales
∑
n FμnRn/(py) 0.153 0.103 0.102 Compustat
Average R&D/ADV
∑
n FμnRn/Mn 24.15 . 26.40 Compustat
Regression coefficients
Gibrat’s coefficient βΔsales/sales -0.0326 -0.0218 -0.0325 Table 1
R&D intensity coeff. βrd/sales -0.1030 -0.1237 -0.1035 Table 1
ADV intensity coeff. βadv/sales -0.0353 . -0.0317 Table 1
R&D/ADV coefficient βrd/adv -0.0677 . -0.0719 Table 1
Table 7: Targeted moments: Model #1: advertising and constant returns to scale in R&D;
Model #2: No advertising and decreasing returns to scale in R&D.
of firm growth decreases with firm size, the rate at which it does is much lower than both
that of the model with advertising and that of the data. Regarding the standard deviation of
R&D intensity, the model without advertising does not predict the monotonically decreasing
relationship with firm size that we see in the data, while the model with advertising matches
this observation (with the exception of the last quintile). From that perspective, the model
with advertising does a better job at explaining the evolution of second order moments of
firm growth and R&D intensity.
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Notes: Firms are ranked in size quintiles according to their normalized level of sales (sales
as a ratio of average sales in the same year). R&D intensities are measured as the ratio
of total R&D expenditures to total sales within each group. The standard deviation in the
first quintile is normalized to one.
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Results We assume that a time- and size-invariant subsidy s ∈ (0, 1) is given to each type
of firm conducting R&D. This subsidy is financed by a lump-sum tax on households. The
Figure 6: Standard deviations (relative to 1st quintile): Models vs Data.
R&D cost functions now read Re(xe) = (1−s)νQ¯xe, Rz(zj) = (1−s)χ̂qjzψ̂j and Rx(Xn, n) =
(1− s)χ˜Q¯X ψ˜n nσ.
Figure 7 shows the percentage change, with respect to the no-subsidy allocation (s = 0), in
growth, entry and internal innovation rates, under both calibrated economies and for different
levels of the subsidy. In line with previous studies, we find that the subsidy increases growth.
This is because innovation becomes cheaper, which fosters entry and raises R&D expenditure
for all firms.
More importantly, we find that the subsidy has a bigger impact on growth in the economy
with advertising and constant returns to scale in the R&D technology (red dashed line in
Figure 7). For instance, in the economy with advertising, a 50% subsidy increases the growth
rate to g = 2.79%, while in the economy without advertising a subsidy of the same size
increases the rate to g = 2.67%, i.e. 0.12 percentage points lower. This differential gets
bigger with the subsidy. For instance, a subsidy of 75% increases the growth rate by 0.29
percentage points more in the economy with advertising.
In the economy with advertising, the subsidy has a much larger positive impact on entry,
as R&D is cheaper and smaller firms benefit more from innovating through the advertising
spillover channel. The impact of the subsidy on the internal innovation rate is also stronger.
Both of these contribute to growth disproportionately more than they do in the economy
without advertising.
Another noteworthy effect lies in Figure 8, which plots the change in the external in-
novation rate for different firm sizes for a change from s = 0% to s = 20%. When there
are constant returns to scale in R&D and the spillover effect in advertising is active (red
dashed line), firms are more responsive to the subsidy in terms of external R&D. This is be-
cause in the economy without advertising, larger firms are less efficient in conducting R&D,
which dampens their response to the subsidy. This is particularly true for larger firms as the
difference in external R&D response to a given change in subsidies gets larger with firm size.
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Figure 7: Percentage change, with respect to s = 0, in growth (g), entry (xe/F ), and inter-
nal innovation (z) rates, in both calibrated economies (dashed red line: economy calibrated
with advertising and constant returns in R&D [Table 2]; solid blue line: economy calibrated
with no advertising and decreasing returns to scale in R&D [Table 6]).
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Figure 8: Percentage change in external innovation intensity for an increase from s = 0%
to s = 20%, across firm sizes, under both calibrated economies.
Our results suggest that identifying the source of technical efficiency in producing inno-
vation across firm sizes has very relevant implications for the impact of industrial policies
directed to increase growth.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a model of firm dynamics and endogenous growth through
product innovations that explicitly incorporates advertising decisions by firms. In modeling
advertising, we have been inspired by observations from the empirical marketing literature,
specifically the existence of advertising spillovers across goods. In our calibrated model,
smaller firms benefit more in terms of decreased advertising costs from brand extension.
Such extensions are achieved through external R&D, and smaller firms are, therefore, rela-
tively more concerned with conducting innovative activities, as these firms benefit more from
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advertising additional product lines due to the spillover effect. This mechanism generates
the empirical observation that R&D intensity is decreasing with firm size even in the absence
of differences in R&D technology across firm size.
We have shown that the model can both qualitatively and quantitatively match empir-
ical regularities across sizes in sales growth, R&D intensity and advertising intensity. On
the basis of our calibration, we have shown that advertising is detrimental to growth (and
welfare) because it crowds out innovation investment within the firm. Even though adver-
tising increases aggregate consumption contemporaneously by shifting preferences toward
certain goods, it substantially decreases long term growth as it shifts incentives away from
productivity-enhancing activities. Key to this argument is that R&D and advertising are
strategic substitutes in the equilibrium of the calibrated model. We confirm this substitution
empirically by exploiting exogenous cross-state and time variation in the cost of innovation
arising from changes in the tax treatment of R&D in the U.S. from the 1980s onwards.
Based on these results, we have proposed a set of growth-enhancing industrial policies.
First, we have shown that advertising taxes are relatively ineffective because the elasticity
of advertising to sales is low and outside firms are deterred from entry. Both of these mute
the effects of the tax on growth. Second, R&D subsidies have a higher impact on growth
in an economy with advertising and constant returns to scale in R&D than in one in which
there is no advertising and where larger firms are technologically less efficient in conducting
innovative activities.
Identifying the source of decreasing R&D intensity with firm size is then an important
question. Further understanding the consequences of R&D size dependence and studying
the role of other types of intangible investments on innovation and firm dynamics remain
interesting avenue for future research.
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A Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Value Functions
The value function for a typical incumbent firm with intrinsic quality portfolio q and n products
at time t, denoted by Vn,t(q), is given by:
Vn,t(q) = max
xt,{zj,t}
{∑
qj∈q
(
π˜tqj − χ̂zψ̂j,tqj
)
Δt− χ˜nσ+ψ˜xψ˜t Q¯tΔt+ γtQ¯tn
η
1−ζ
+ e−rt+ΔtΔt
(∑
qj∈q
[
zj,tΔt+ o(Δt)
]
Vn,t+Δt
(
q\−{qj} ∪+ {qj(1 + λI)}
)
+
∑
qj∈q
[
τtΔt+ o(Δt)
]
Vn−1,t+Δt
(
q\−{qj}
)
+
[
nxtΔt+ o(Δt)
] ∫ 1
0
Vn+1,t+Δt
(
q ∪+ {qj(1 + λE)}
)
dj
+
[
1−
∑
qj∈q
zj,tΔt−
∑
qj∈q
τtΔt− nxtΔt− o(Δt)
]
Vn,t+Δt(q)
)}
+ o(Δt)
where o(Δt) has the property limΔ→0
o(Δt)
Δt = 0. Here, we use the fact that, for each Poisson
arrival rate k ∈ {z, x, τ}, the term kΔt + o(Δt) (respectively, 1 − kΔt − o(Δt)) approximates the
probability of exactly one Poisson event (respectively, zero Poisson events) within an interval of short
length (i.e., for small Δ > 0). The probability of two or more events is equal to o(Δt) in the limit as
Δ → 0.
The interpretation of the right-hand side of the equation is as follows. The first line includes flow
intrinsic profits for each good in the firm’s portfolio, net of internal and external R&D costs, with
the last term being extrinsic flow profits; the second, third, fourth and fifth lines include the different
scenarios that can arise at the next instant, all of which are exponentially discounted by the interest
rate rt+ΔtΔt: an internal innovation on some good j, with overall probability
∑
qj∈q
[
zj,tΔt+o(Δt)
]
,
which advances the quality portfolio by a factor of λI on the newly innovated product (second line);
external innovations, either by an external firm on some currently held good, which occurs with overall
probability
∑
qj∈q
[
τtΔt+ o(Δt)
]
(third line), or by the firm in question over a randomly drawn good
from the [0, 1] continuum, which occurs with overall probability
∑
qj∈q
[
nxtΔt+ o(Δt)
]
(fourth line).
With the remaining probably, none of these events occurs, and both the quality portfolio and the
number of products of the firm stay the same (fifth line).
To obtain Equation (18), simply subtract e−rt+ΔtΔtVn,t(q) from both sides, divide every term
by Δt, and take the continuous-time limit as Δ → 0 (using the fact that limΔ→0 o(Δt)Δt = 0 and
limΔ→0 1−e
−rt+ΔtΔt
Δt = rt).
As for entrants, the value function is
V0,t = max
xe,t>0
{
− νxeQ¯Δt+ e−rt+ΔtΔt
([
xe,tΔt+ o(Δt)
]
Ej
{
V1,t+Δt({qj(1 + λE)})
}
+
[
1− xe,tΔt− o(Δt)
]
V0,t+Δt
)}
+ o(Δt)
where V0,t denotes firm value at (n,q) = (0, ∅). The first line includes the cost of entry (first
term), and the value of the firm in the event of entry at the next instant, which occurs with prob-
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 50 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
ability
[
xe,tΔt + o(Δt)
]
. The second line shows that the firm remains with zero products with the
complementary probability. Once again, the probability of two or more such events occurring simul-
taneously is a higher-order term inside o(Δt).
To obtain Equation (19), once again subtract e−rt+ΔtΔtV0,t from both sides, divide through by
Δt, and take the limit as Δ → 0.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Assume that zj,t = zt, ∀j ∈ [0, 1], a result that we prove independently in Proposition 3. At any
time t, aggregate quality is given by:
Q¯t+Δt =
[
τtΔt+ o(Δt)
]
(1 + λE)Q¯t︸ ︷︷ ︸
One external innovation
+
[
ztΔt+ o(Δt)
]
(1 + λI)Q¯t︸ ︷︷ ︸
One internal innovation
+
[
1− τtΔt− ztΔt− o(Δt)
]
Q¯t︸ ︷︷ ︸
No innovations
+ o(Δt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2 or more
innovations
The interpretation of this equation is straightforward: after an instant of length Δt, aggregate
intrinsic quality either increases by a fixed factor, due to an external innovation or an internal one
(with probability τtΔt + o(Δt) and ztΔt + o(Δt), respectively), or it remains the same (with the
complementary probability). The probability of two or more innovations is a second-order event.
Subtracting Q¯t from both sides, dividing through by Δt, taking the limit as Δ → 0 and using that
limΔ→0
o(Δt)
Δt = 0, gives
˙¯Qt = τλ
EQ¯t + zλ
IQ¯t. Therefore,
g = τλE + zλI
as we sought to show. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Let μn denote the equilibrium share of incumbent firms that own n ≥ 1 product lines, such that
μn ∈ [0, 1], ∀n, and
∑+∞
n=1 μn = 1. The invariant distribution must satisfy the following flow equations:
μ1 =
xe
Fτ
# products Inflows Outflows
n = 0 : Fμ1τ = xe
n = 1 : Fμ22τ + xe = Fμ1(x1 + τ)
n ≥ 2 : Fμn+1(n+ 1)τ + Fμn−1(n− 1)xn−1 = Fμnn(xn + τ)
The left-hand (or right-hand) side of these equalities describes the mass of firms that enters into
(or exits out of) the state identified by the first column. For instance, for n ≥ 2, inflows are given
by the mass of size-(n+1) incumbent firms that lost a product through creative destruction, and the
mass of size-(n− 1) incumbent firms that gained one through external innovation. Similarly, outflows
are given by the mass of size-n incumbents that either lost a product to another incumbent, or gained
one thanks to external innovation. Because innovation allows firms to gain or lose only one product
at a time, potential entrants (entering at rate xe) only feature as a flow out of n = 0, or into n = 1.
We prove that Equation (22) is the solution to the above system of flow equations by use of
mathematical induction. Specializing the formula to n = 1, and using the convention that
∏0
i=1 xi = 1,
we have
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which is true by the first flow equation. For n = 2, Equation (22) gives
μ2 =
xex1
2Fτ2
which can be written as 2Fτ2μ2 = x1xe. Adding xeτ to both sides an dividing through by Fτ we
obtain μ22τ +
xe
F =
xe
F
(
x1
τ + 1
)
. Rearranging, we obtain exactly the flow equation for n = 2.
Having shown that Equation (22) holds for n = 1 and n = 2, it is enough to show that it
holds for n + 1, assuming it does for n and n − 1, where n ≥ 2 is arbitrary. Accordingly, suppose
μn−1 = xeF
∏n−2
i=1 xi
(n−1)τn−1 and μn =
xe
F
∏n−1
i=1 xi
nτn . Plugging these into the third flow equation, we have
Fμn+1(n+ 1)τ + xe
∏n−2
i=1 xi
τn−1
xn−1 = xe
∏n−1
i=1 xi
τn
(xn + τ)
Simplifying,
Fμn+1(n+ 1)τ = xe
(∏n−1
i=1 xi
τn
(xn + τ)−
∏n−2
i=1 xi
τn−1
xn−1
)
= xe
(∏n
i=1 xi
τn
+ τ
∏n−1
i=1 xi
τn
−
∏n−1
i=1 xi
τn−1
)
= xe
∏n
i=1 xi
τn
which implies that μn+1 =
xe
F
∏n
i=1 xi
(n+1)τn+1 , what we wanted to show. 
The first-order conditions are:
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We find Γ and {Υn}+∞n=1 using the method of undetermined coefficients. Plugging the guess
Vn(qf ) = Γ
∑
qj∈qf qj +ΥnQ¯ into (18), we get that
rΓ
∑
qj∈qf
qj + rΥnQ¯ = max
x∈[0,x¯]
{zj∈[0,z¯]}Jf
{ ∑
qj∈qf
[
zjΓλ
Iqj + π˜qj + τ
(
(Υn−1 −Υn)Q¯− Γqj
)
− χ̂zψ̂j qj
]
+ nx
(
ΓQ¯(1 + λE) + (Υn+1 −Υn)Q¯
)
− χ˜nσ+ψ˜xψ˜Q¯+ γQ¯n η1−ζ
}
+ΥnQ¯g
Equating the terms with qj and Q¯ gives the following pair of optimization problems:
(qj) : rΓ = max
zj
{
π˜ + zjΓλ
I − τΓ− χ̂zψ̂j
}
(Q¯) : (r − g)Υn = max
xn
{
(Υn−1 −Υn)nτ + nxn
(
Γ(1 + λE) + Υn+1 −Υn
)
−χ˜nσ+ψ˜xψ˜n + γn
η
1−ζ
}
zj =
(
ΓλI
ψ̂χ̂
) 1
ψ̂−1
xn = n
1−σ−ψ˜
ψ˜−1
(
Γ(1 + λE) + Υn+1 −Υn
ψ˜χ˜
) 1
ψ˜−1
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respectively. Assuming that there is positive entry in equilibrium (xe > 0), we can exploit the
free-entry condition V0 = 0 in (19) to get that
Γ =
ν −Υ1
1 + λE
This means that the optimal internal R&D investment by incumbents is
zj =
(
λI(ν −Υ1)
ψ̂χ̂(1 + λE)
) 1
ψ̂−1
so zj = z, ∀j ∈ [0, 1]. Back into the optimality condition for z, we can obtain the implied rate of
creative destruction:
τ =
1
ν −Υ1
⎡⎢⎣π˜ − χ̂( λI(ν −Υ1)
χ̂ψ̂(1 + λE)
) ψ̂
ψ̂−1
⎤⎥⎦− ρ
1 + λE
where we have used that g = r − ρ from the Euler equation, and g = τλE + zλI . It remains to
find an expression for Υn. Using free-entry, we know
xn = n
1−σ−ψ˜
ψ˜−1
(
ν −Υ1 +Υn+1 −Υn
ψ˜χ˜
) 1
ψ˜−1
Back into the second maximization problem, we get the second-order difference equation
(r − g)Υn = (Υn−1 −Υn)nτ + γnη/(1−ζ) + χ˜(ψ˜ − 1)n−
σ
ψ˜−1
[
ν −Υ1 +Υn+1 −Υn
ψ˜χ˜
] ψ˜
ψ˜−1
Solving for Υn+1 gives (24). Using V0 = 0 and the guess Vn = Γ
∑
j qj +ΥnQ¯, it is clear that the
boundary condition for this difference equation must then be Υ0 = 0. 
B Welfare Effects of Advertising
Having argued that advertising is detrimental for growth within the calibrated economy, we now
turn to welfare effects. There exists a long-lasting debate in Economics about the welfare implications
of advertising. This literature has studied the effects of advertising on welfare through mainly two
potential channels: informative advertising and taste-shifting advertising.
Models of informative advertising are theories in which advertising can be used to remove frictions
in markets with imperfect information by providing relevant information about a product quality (or
simply about the existence of the product). Such approach can be found for instance in Nelson
(1974), Butters (1977), and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). In that context, advertising could be
welfare improving. On the other hand, Becker and Murphy (1993) argue that advertising could
simply be used to alter consumer preferences by creating favorable associations to the good that
is being advertised. Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986) further argue
that expenditures in uninformative advertising could still signal a product quality and hence provide
ex-post information.
Another strand of the literature considers advertising as a pure taste shifter by manipulating
consumer preferences (see among others Dixit and Norman (1978), Becker and Murphy (1993) and
Benhabib and Bisin (2002, 2011)). Molinari and Turino (2015) consider the case of purely combative
advertising, in which advertising does not affect consumer preferences in equilibrium but firms nev-
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ertheless advertise to maintain their market shares. In this case, advertising expenditures are a pure
waste of resources. When advertising directly affects tastes, a relevant question is whether welfare
should be compared using ex-ante or ex-post preferences. In addition, advertising could distort prices
and monopoly power, in which case advertising could be welfare decreasing even when measured
by ex-post preferences (Dixit and Norman (1978), Benhabib and Bisin (2002)). In this section, we
argue that one should consider yet another side effect of advertising when quantifying its welfare
implications, namely its effect on R&D investment, innovation and economic growth.
To compute ex-post welfare along a BGP, some algebra shows that we can rewrite the household
utility in equilibrium as:
U(C0, g) = ln (C0) /ρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Level
effect
+ g/ρ2︸︷︷︸
Growth
effect
(30)
where C0 is proportional to Q¯0 = 1 (a normalization). To study the effect of advertising, we
compare ex-post welfare in the calibrated economy across different advertising efficiency levels (θ).
The first term in the ex-post welfare decomposition accounts for a “level effect” of advertising:
by conducting advertising, firms expand demand contemporaneously, which increases the perceived
utility derived from aggregate consumption. This is because advertising ultimately constitutes a
demand shifter for the firm by effectively changing consumer’s preferences, as seen in Equation (7).
Additionally, as we have argued above, advertising critically shapes the dynamic incentives to conduct
R&D and, therefore, has an indirect effect on growth. This is captured by the second term, which we
label the “growth effect” of advertising.49
While advertising unambiguously increases welfare through the level effect, its impact through
the growth effect is negative in our calibrated model. Figure 9 plots welfare and its level-growth
decomposition as a function of θ. Once again, the level effect is unambiguously positive and, as we
have just discussed, advertising decreases growth in our calibration, so the final effect is ambiguous.
Using our calibrated set of parameters, however, we find that welfare is reduced because the growth
effects dominates. According to this result, a policy scheme in which the advertising sector is taxed
can be welfare-improving for the economy. We analyze this implication in detail in Section 7.1.
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Figure 9: Welfare decomposition, for different values of advertising efficiency (θ). The
calibrated value of θ is marked by the dashed vertical line.
49In Appendix G.2.3 we present a version of the model in which advertising does not increase the value of
consumption in equilibrium. Making welfare comparisons in that case would be equivalent to comparing utility
using ex-ante preferences. In that case, welfare is unambiguously decreasing in advertising efficiency (θ).
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In sum, in our calibrated economy R&D and advertising crowd each other out, which is relevant
for our subsequent policy analysis. Generally, our results add to the existing debate about advertising
and welfare by showing that, even in a model in which advertising effectively increases utility (through
a “level effect” in our model but potentially from information in alternative formulations), one should
consider the potential side effects of cheaper advertising. We show that one such side effect is its impact
on economic growth in the long run coming from the substitution between R&D and advertising.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log
(
Other Exp.
Sales
)
log
(
Other Exp.
Sales
)
log
(
Other Exp.
Sales
)
log
(
Other Exp.
Sales
)
log
(
Other Exp.
Sales
)
Tax credit 0.0309
dummy (0.0151)
State credit 0.686
rate (0.168)
Tax-adjusted 0.696
state rate (0.184)
Effective 0.844
state rate (0.236)
R&D -0.939
user cost (0.264)
Controls     
Time FE     
Industry FE     
State FE     
Observations 28660 27376 27376 25260 25260
R2 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57
C Effect of R&D Subsidies on Other Expenses
Table 8: Effect of R&D subsidy on selling, general and administrative expenses (excluding
R&D and Advertising) at the firm level
)
Notes: Data from Compustat from 1950 to 2009, Wilson (2009) and Falato and Sim (2014).
Controls include sales (logarithm), age, financial constraint and state tax and selling. Firm
age is measured as the elapsed time since the first observation in the data. Our measure
of financial constraints is sale minus purchases of common and preferred stock, divided by
sales. Standard errors are clustered at the state level (in parentheses).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
ADV and R&D firms All firms
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Sales (million U.S.D.) 2539.6 12222.5 1823.4 10014.5
Age (in years) 14.6 12.72 14.44 12.65
Equity Fin./Sales 0.269 6.09 1.38 80.14
R&D (million U.S.D.) 113.5 580.8 63.55 397
ADV (million U.S.D.) 73.2 402.9 46.1 271.1
R&D/Sales 0.102 0.136 0.109 0.157
ADV/Sales 0.037 0.068 0.036 0.067
R&D/ADV 26.4 229.56
Share of firms doing R&D 33.07%
Share of sales from firms doing R&D 46.23%
Share of firms doing ADV 33.86%
Share of sales from firms doing ADV 36.16%
Share of ADV by firms doing R&D 58.02%
D Data
Table A.1: Descriptive statistics. Compustat data from 1980 to 2015. Means and standard
deviations in our sample of firms performing R&D and advertising vs. all firms in Compu-
stat. Reported shares are computed for firm/year observations with respect to the whole
Compustat universe.
Notes: Sales, R&D and advertising expenditures are in thousands of U.S.D. Employment is in thousands of employees. See Table 1 for
details on the sample selection. Standard errors are clustered by firm (in parentheses). Legend: 10%; 5% ; 1%.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ΔAssets
Assets log
(
R&D
Assets
)
log
(
Adv
Assets
)
log
(
R&D
Adv
) ΔEmp
Emp log
(
R&D
Emp
)
log
(
Adv
Emp
)
log
(
R&D
Adv
)
log(Assets) -0.0869 -0.116 -0.0687 -0.0475
(0.0121) (0.00830) (0.00985) (0.0117)
log(Emp) -0.0200 -0.0657 -0.00529 -0.0604
(0.00433) (0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0136)
Firm Age -0.00464 0.00618 0.00590 0.000281 -0.00306 0.00300 0.00181 0.00119
(0.000933) (0.00152) (0.00186) (0.00216) (0.000313) (0.00191) (0.00227) (0.00226)
Fin. Const. -0.00225 -0.00176 -0.000601 -0.00116 0.000648 -0.0000700 0.00142 -0.00149
(0.000947) (0.00233) (0.00284) (0.00490) (0.00127) (0.00214) (0.00330) (0.00498)
Constant 0.652 -2.979 -4.334 1.355 0.127 0.696 -0.482 1.177
(0.126) (0.370) (0.301) (0.228) (0.0622) (0.540) (0.456) (0.220)
Time FE        
Industry FE        
Observations 21954 24856 24856 24856 23145 23427 23427 23427
R2 0.07 0.47 0.33 0.44 0.05 0.53 0.28 0.45
Table A.2: Facts 1 to 4 with assets and employment as measures of size.
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E The BGP Algorithm
To compute the equilibrium variables in the BGP, we loop over the fixed point of Φ¯t by
using Φ¯t = Φ
∗Q¯t, with Φ∗ from Equation (16). In light of the above discussion, we check
for convergence by imposing that the value of firm size, Υn, converges to a line as n grows
larger. We truncate the size space at some large N ∈ N. The following describes the steps
of the algorithm:
1. Guess a number Φ∗ > 0.
2. Compute Υ1 by imposing Υ2 = 2Υ1 in Equation (24) at n = 1.
(a) Compute g from (20), τ implied by (21), Γ from (23), and z from (25).
(b) Compute {Υn}+∞n=2 using (24) forward from Υ1 and Υ0 = 0, {xn}+∞n=1 from (26),
and F/xe using that
∑N
n=1 μn = 1, where μn comes from (22).
3. Verify convergence of firm size distribution.50 If there is no convergence by iteration
k ∈ N, go back to step 2 with the new guess for Υ1 to be the solution to (24) at n = 1
when Υ2 = 2Υ1 − εk, for a small εk > 0.
4. Compute Φ∗ as the solution to (16), and compare it to the initial guess. If it is too far,
go back to step 1 using this solution as the new guess.
In step 2, we compute the maximum value for Υ1 such that Υn can be weakly concave
(i.e, (Υn+1 − Υn) decreasing). In particular, we force Υn to be straight line from n = 1 to
n = 2 (note Υ2 −Υ1 = Υ1 −Υ0). If μn does not converge, it must be because (Υn −Υn−1)
has not settled to a flat line as n has approached N , which means that the guess for Υ1 was
incorrect. Then, we iterate on new guesses for Υ1 to allow for more concavity on the Υn
sequence (indeed, note that in any iteration k ≥ 1 we always start the Υn sequence at a Υ1
such that Υ2 −Υ1 < Υ1 −Υ0). In step 3, we in turn bisect the new guess by a factor of ten
on each new iteration, i.e. εk+1 = εk/10. Finally, in step 4, we drop the old Φ
∗ guess in case
of no convergence, and use the resulting fixed-point as the new guess.
F Comparative Statics on BGP (Numerical Exam-
ple)
We present a few comparative statics results in order to illustrate our main advertising-
innovation trade-off.
To illustrate the qualitative features of the model, this section presents a set of compar-
ative statics exercises on outcomes of the balanced growth path equilibrium with respect to
advertising efficiency (θ) and the degree of returns to scale in R&D (ψ˜+ σ). The purpose of
this section is threefold: (i) to show how our model can generate decreasing R&D intensity
with firm size under constant returns to scale in R&D; (ii) to confirm that the model can
potentially deliver both substitutability and complementarity between R&D and advertis-
ing; and (iii) to show that our model can be solved with increasing returns to scale in R&D
technology. All the parameter values are set for expositional purposes.
50We further verified that there exists a unique value of Υ1 for which we obtain convergence for a given Φ
∗.
Advertising Efficiency (θ) Figure 10 shows, as a function of firm size (n), BGP re-
sults for the expenditure intensity on external R&D (i.e. Rx/n) on the left panel, and the
expenditure intensity on advertising (i.e. Mn/n) on the right panel for different values of
advertising efficiency, θ (recall Equation (3)).51
51The parameter values used in this example are: ρ = 0.02, ψ̂ = ψ˜ = 1−σ = 2, λE = λI = 0.05, χ̂ = 0.1, χ˜ = 10,
ν = 2, β = 0.2, η = 0.5 and ζ = 0.1.
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First, in an economy with no role for advertising (θ = 0), we return to a Klette and
Kortum (2004) environment in which innovation incentives are constant in size. The gain of
acquiring new products is proportional to size, or Υn = nΥ, and therefore expenditures are
constant in the cross-section of firms. When we introduce a motive for advertising (θ > 0),
all firms start investing in the latter. Moreover, because smaller firms benefit marginally
more from expanding their product portfolios (η < 1), they invest more in R&D relative to
larger firms.
As θ increases further (with all other parameters fixed), advertising becomes more efficient
for all levels of firm size, and the aforementioned effects are reinforced. Moreover, since
advertising now delivers higher returns, in the margin small firms now benefit even more
than they did before, relative to larger firms. As a consequence, expenditures decrease faster
with size (i.e. Rx/n and Mn/n become steeper). In other words, the advertising spillover
effect tilts dynamic R&D incentives toward smaller firms. In this example, we can notice
that R&D and advertising are substitutes since larger values of θ are associated with lower
investment in R&D and larger advertising expenditures. Next, we provide an example in
which R&D and advertising are complements.
R&D and advertising as complements We now show that our model can also gener-
ate complementarity between R&D and advertising. Figure 11 depicts the change in external
R&D across firm size for different levels of advertising efficiency as well as total incumbent
R&D and advertising as a share of GDP.52 In this example, R&D and advertising are com-
Figure 10: External R&D expenditure intensity in BGP (left panel), and R&D and adver-
tising expenditures as a share of GDP in BGP, for different values of advertising efficiency,
θ (right panel).
( )
Note: External R&D expenditure intensity is normalized by aggregate intrinsic quality, Q¯.
52The parameter values used in this example are: ρ = 0.02, ψ̂ = ψ˜ = 2, σ = −0.85, λE = λI = 0.05, χ̂ = 1,
χ˜ = 5, ν = 2, β = 0.2, η = 0.9 and ζ = 0.3.
plements. An increase in advertising efficiency is associated with larger investment in both
advertising and R&D. As we shall see, whether R&D and advertising are complements or
substitutes plays a crucial role in determining the growth and welfare effect of advertising.
In Section 5.1, we calibrated our model to determine which case is the relevant one in the
data.
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Returns to Scale in Innovation Finally, we show that the result that small firms are
more innovation-intensive does not hinge on the relative degree of scalability in the returns
of different types of innovation technologies. In Figure 12 we show three solutions of the
advertising model, with decreasing, constant, and increasing returns to scale in external
R&D, respectively.
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Note: External R&D expenditure intensity is normalized by aggregate intrinsic quality, Q¯.
Figure 11: External R&D intensity in BGP (left panel), and R&D and advertising ex-
penditures as a share of GDP in BGP, for different values of advertising efficiency, θ (right
panel).
Decreasing returns lower innovation incentives for all sizes with respect to constant re-
turns, but make it even more profitable for small firms to invest more intensely into R&D (i.e,
the Rx/n line steepens). Symmetrically, having increasing returns in innovation increases op-
timal intensity for all n. Interestingly, so long as the degree of increasing returns is not too
Figure 12: Comparative statics for R&D intensity across n, for σ+ψ˜ = 1.05 > 1 (decreasing
returns), σ + ψ˜ = 1 (constant returns), and σ + ψ˜ = 0.95 < 1 (increasing returns).
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strong, smaller firms may still optimally choose to invest relatively more in R&D in order to
rip the benefits of advertising spillovers, as is the case in the figure. This occurs even though
the marginal benefit from innovation is lower than in the other two cases (so that the Rx/n
line flattens but it is still decreasing).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1902
G Model Extensions
G.1 Patents and Major Innovations
In our baseline model, smaller firms are more innovative because of the advertising
spillover effect, in spite of there being constant returns to scale in R&D. Besides differences in
R&D intensity across size, however, the literature has emphasized other motives why smaller
firms might be relatively more efficient in conducting innovations. One such literature has
focused on patent behavior. Firstly, entrants and smaller firms typically produce relatively
more major and radical innovations (when the quality of a patent is based on the number
of external citations that it receives).53 Secondly, these firms also tend to patent relatively
more on average. In this section, we show that a simple extension of our baseline model
with advertising can deliver both of these additional facts even in the absence of decreasing
returns to scale in R&D.
We first demonstrate how to obtain the first stylized fact, namely that smaller firms
and entrants generate more major technological improvements. Intuitively, since in our
specification these firms invest relatively more than larger firms in external innovation because
they benefit marginally more from the advertising effect, the result directly obtains if the
innovation step size for external innovations is larger than that of internal innovations.
Let us assume that each innovation creates a new patent that potentially cites other
patents that exist at the time the new patent is introduced. Following Akcigit and Kerr
(2018), each innovation belongs to a technological cluster, and there exist two types of tech-
nological advances: follow-up and major advances. A major advance in a production line
creates a whole new cluster of innovation, while a follow-up innovation belongs to the same
cluster as the patent that it improves upon. Each patent within a technological cluster is
assumed to cite all the previous innovations in the same cluster with some positive proba-
bility. Consequently, major advances in the model do not cite any other existing patent and
potentially receive citations from follow-up innovations within the same cluster. Once a new
major innovation creates a new technological cluster, the cluster that it replaces receives no
more citations. Likewise, follow-up innovations can also receive citations from subsequent
follow-up innovations in the same cluster. However, on average, major advances receive more
citations than follow-up innovations.
Formally, we extend the baseline model by allowing external innovations to result in major
technological advances with some probability. Whereas internal R&D can only result in a
follow-up innovation, with step size λI > 0, external innovation can either be a follow-up
within an existing technological cluster, or be a major advance and create a new technological
cluster altogether. Let ω denote the probability with which a successful external innovation
leads to a major technological advance. In this case, the step size for quality improvement is
equal to λH > λI . With the remaining probability (1−ω), the successful external innovation
is a follow-up, which leads to a step size λL ∈ (0, λH ]. In sum, for any product line j and a
small interval Δt > 0, intrinsic quality is given by
53Indeed, Akcigit and Kerr (2018) show that the fraction of a firm’s patent in the top patent quality decile is
decreasing with firm size.
qj,t+Δt = qjt +
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
λHqjt w.prob. ωτtΔt+ o(Δt) [External, major advance]
λLqjt w.prob. (1− ω)τtΔt+ o(Δt) [External, follow-up]
λIqjt w.prob. zjtΔt+ o(Δt) [Internal]
0 w.prob. 1− τtΔt− zjtΔt− o(Δt) [No innovations]
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Therefore, the average quality improvement from a successful external innovation is equal
to λE ≡ ωλH + (1 − ω)λL, which means that the growth and creative destruction rates of
the economy are still given by (20) and (21), respectively. Therefore, our baseline model can
be thought of a special case of the extended model with patents, and none of the results
derived in the baseline case will change. Additionally, the model now predicts that smaller
firms, while exhibiting a higher R&D intensity because of the advertising spillover effect, also
produce relatively more major innovations.
Let us now show how the model can deliver the prediction that smaller firms tend to
patent relatively more on average, and that their patents are of higher quality (when quality
is measured by the number of external citation that it receives). For this, we can characterize
expected patent citations. Let us assume that the probability that the n-th follow-up inno-
vation cites all relevant past patents is κn, where 0 < κ < 1. This generates a decline in the
relative citation rate as a technological cluster ages. We can then derive the expected num-
ber of citations received by major as well as follow-up innovations. For major technological
advances, this number is given by:
E[citM ] ≡ τω
τ + z
· 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
External and major
innovation
+Λ
{
κ+ Λ
[
κ2 + Λ
(
κ3 + . . .
) ]}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Follow-up innovations
=
∞∑
j=1
(κΛ)j (G.1)
In the first term, τωτ+z is the probability that a successful innovation in a given product
line is external and major, which creates a new cluster and does not add a citation within
the existing cluster. In the second term, we have defined
Λ ≡ τ(1− ω) + z
τ + z
as the probability of a follow-up innovation, coming either from an external or an internal
innovation. The probability that such an innovation yields a single citation is κ, and therefore
the probability of the n-th follow-up yielding a citation is (κΛ)n. The expected number of
citations is then the sum of all such probabilities. Since κΛ < 1, Equation (G.1) can be
expressed as:
E[citM ] =
κΛ
1− κΛ
A similar derivation shows that the expected number of citations for the n-th follow-up
innovation in a given technological cluster, denoted E[citFn ], is given by:
E[citFn ] =
κn+1Λ
1− κΛ
Therefore, E[citFn ] < E[cit
M ] for any number of follow-ups, n ∈ N. Since in our baseline
model with advertising smaller firms invest relatively more in external R&D, these firms
also hold relatively more patents, and these patents are of higher quality on average (as
measured by the number of external citations). In sum, our baseline model can generate the
observed negative correlation between firm size and the fraction of top quality patents in the
firm’s patent portfolio, even when there exist non-decreasing returns to scale in the R&D
technology.
G.2 Alternative Advertising Functions
The main mechanisms presented in this paper rely on two important aspects of advertis-
ing. The first one is that advertising acts as a demand shifter in a way that is comparable
to the effect of increased intrinsic quality from innovation. This is a necessary condition for
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the substitution between R&D and advertising that we obtain in our calibration exercise.
Second, the existence of spillover in advertising implies that R&D intensity can be decreasing
in firm size even in the absence of decreasing returns to scale in innovation. In this section,
we show different alternative ways to model advertising which also lead to advertising being
a demand shifter. This implies that the results that we obtain in this paper would still
qualitatively hold under the different alternative models presented below.
G.2.1 Goodwill Accumulation
In our baseline model, we assume that the advertising decision is static. Advertising
expenditures affect current demand but have no long-lasting effect on consumer demand.
An alternative way of modeling advertising and its effects on demand which is often used in
the literature is to assume that advertising expenditures accumulate over time to increase a
brand equity (so-called goodwill). Goodwill in turns acts as a demand shifter. In discrete
time settings, the evolution of the stock of goodwill for good j at time t (Gj,t) is usually
modeled as follows:
Gj,t = δGj,t−1 + dj,t (G.2)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] controls the rate at which goodwill depreciates.
Here, we show that allowing for goodwill accumulation would not change the results
derived in our baseline model. We can also notice that the marketing literature shows that
the depreciation rate is relatively high so that the effect of advertising on sales has almost
entirely vanished after one year. In addition, the introduction of goodwill in the model only
affects the decision of firms of different ages. Since the focus of our paper is on firm behavior
across firm size, not modeling the evolution of goodwill over firm age is not a major concern.54
We now present a discrete-time version of our model with goodwill and show that it does
not significantly change the problem of intermediate good producers. We use Equation (G.2)
as the evolution of goodwill over time.
The final good is now defined as:
Yt =
1
1− β
∫ 1
0
qβj,t(1 +Gj,t)
βy1−βj,t dj
54We can further notice that firm age does not significantly affect advertising intensity and the relative use of
R&D and advertising in Table 1.
The inverse demand function for good j is given by:
pj,t = q
β
j,t(1 +Gj,t)
βy−βj,t
Advertising goodwill (Gj,t) is thus a demand shifter. Intermediate good producers max-
imize their profit subject to the inverse demand function and the dynamics of goodwill.
Operational profit (profit before R&D and advertising expenditures) can be written as:
πj,t = (1− β)
1−β
β β
(
Q¯
wt
) 1−β
β
qj(1 + δGj,t−1 + dj,t)
which is similar to what was obtained in Section 4.4.
G.2.2 Advertising in Utility
In this section, we show that a slight modification of the baseline model which allows
advertising to feature directly into the consumers’ utility function delivers a very similar
allocation, and identical qualitative predictions, as the model in the main text.
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There is no final good sector and the household consumes goods j ∈ [0, 1] directly. The
representative household’s preferences are now represented by:
U =
∫ +∞
0
e−ρt ln
(
Ct
)
dt
where Ct is a consumption aggregator over a mass-one continuum of quality-weighted
good quantities, indexed by j ∈ [0, 1], which takes the form:
Ct =
1
1− β
∫ 1
0
q˜βjty
1−β
jt dj
with β ∈ (0, 1). The flow budget constraint is, therefore:
A˙t = rtAt + wt −
∫ 1
0
pjtyjtdj
where A0 ≥ 0 is given, and pjt is the price of good j. Each good variety j is produced
with technology:
yjt = Q¯tljt
where good j = 0 is the numeraire (so p0,t = 1, ∀t).
Taking initial wealth A0 as given, the representative consumer chooses a path for con-
sumption to maximize utility subject to the flow budget constraint and the no-Ponzi condition
limt→+∞ e−
∫ t
0 rsdsAt ≥ 0. The optimality condition for good j yields:
ωtpjt =
1
Ct
(
yjt
q˜jt
)−β
(G.3)
where ωt ≥ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier, solving
− ω˙t
ωt
= rt − ρ
i.e, ωt = ω0e
− ∫ s0 (rs−ρ)ds. Recalling that q˜jt = qjt + φjt, Equation (G.3) says that the
inverse demand function for goods from households firms is iso-elastic, with β being the
price-elasticity. Solving the incumbent firm’s problem, one can show easily that ωt =
1
Yt
,
where Yt ≡
∫ 1
0 yjtdj denotes aggregate output in the economy. Hence, the Euler equation
reads gt = rt − ρ and the demand function becomes identical to that of the baseline model
(Equation (7)). The two models are therefore qualitatively equivalent.
G.2.3 “Wasteful” Combative Advertising
In our baseline model, advertising not only shifts demand but also has an effect on con-
sumer utility and welfare. In Appendix B, we nevertheless showed that the calibrated version
of the model suggests that advertising is welfare decreasing as the level effect (the increase in
how consumers value their consumption) is more than offset by the negative effect of adver-
tising on growth through the substitution between advertising and R&D at the firm level. In
this section, we show that the same results can be obtained in a model in which advertising
does not increase the value of consumption in equilibrium. This can be seen as a model of
combative (or predatory) advertising in which the advertising efforts of each firm (partially)
cancel out in equilibrium.
Let us define the final good as:
Y =
1
1− β
∫ 1
0
qβj (1 + dj − ιΦ∗)βy1−βj dj
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with ι ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that the effectiveness of advertising at the good level is a
function of the overall level of advertising expenditures in the economy (through Φ∗, i.e. the
normalized aggregate extrinsic quality in the economy). Thus, the more other firms invest
in advertising, the more one firm has to invest itself in order to obtain a given return to
advertising.
We obtain the following demand function:
yj = qj(1 + dj − ιΦ∗)p
− 1
β
j
Intermediate good firms solve their profit maximization problem subject to this demand
function and taking the overall level of advertising in the economy as given. From the firm’s
perspective, advertising acts as a demand shifter in the same way as in our baseline model.
Moreover, it is easy to derive Yt in equilibrium as:
Y =
(
Q¯
w
) 1−β
β
(1− β) 1−2ββ [1 + (1− ι)Φ∗]Q¯
If ι = 1, advertising has no direct effect on consumer’s utility. It can, nevertheless, have
an effect on lifetime utility through its impact on the growth rate of the economy in a way
that is similar to our baseline model. If ι = 0, we return to our benchmark model.
G.2.4 Informative Advertising
In our baseline, model advertising is purely persuasive in the sense that it shifts demand
toward advertised good though increased marginal utility. Alternatively, one could consider
advertising as providing relevant information about the product quality (see for instance
Nelson (1974), Butters (1977),Grossman and Shapiro (1984) or Milgrom and Roberts (1986)).
In this case, advertising could be socially optimal as it could reduce uncertainty or improve
the quality of consumer-firm match.
μpost =
μj/σ
2
j + sj/σ
2
ω
σ−2j + σ
−2
ω
σ2post =
[
1
σ2j
+
1
σ2ω
]−1
In this section, we propose a simple model of informative advertising with differentiated
products. We look at a static model in which advertising is used to provide information about
the quality of the goods. In particular, firms send an imperfect signal about their product
quality through advertising. Consumers passively receive the information and update their
prior about product quality.
Consumers maximize expected utility. We assume that the utility function is quadratic
and given by:
U =
∫ 1
0
qjyj dj − a
∫ 1
0
q2j y
2
j dj
Before receiving signals through advertising, consumers have a prior about the quality
of each good j. This prior is normally distributed with mean μj and variance σ
2
j . Through
advertising, firms can send an imperfect signal (sj) about their product quality, given by:
sj = q
∗
j + ωj
where q∗j is the actual quality of the good and ωj is a Gaussian shock with mean 0 and
variance σ2ω.
We assume that higher advertising expenditures can decrease the variance of the signal.
The posterior distribution of product quality (after receiving the signal) follows a normal
distribution with mean and variance:
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The representative consumer maximizes expected utility after receiving advertising sig-
nals. The demand function for good j can be written as:
yj =
μpost − pj
2a
(
μ2post + σ
2
post
)
For simplicity, let us assume the limiting case as σj goes to infinity (a diffuse prior). In
this case, the posterior distribution has mean μpost = sj and variance σ
2
post = σ
2
ω. Therefore,
the demand for any good j is a decreasing function of the variance of the signal. Since the
precision of the signal is increasing in advertising expenditures, advertising acts as a demand
shifter as in our baseline model.
G.2.5 Advertising and the Price-Elasticity of Demand
A strand of the advertising literature has focused on the effect of advertising on the
elasticity of demand (see, for instance, Molinari and Turino (2015) and Benhabib and Bisin
(2002)). In this section, we present a model in which advertising can change the price-
elasticity of demand. We further show that the demand shifting property of advertising is
maintained so that the results from our baseline model could be obtained in such a framework
as well.
Following Molinari and Turino (2015), we write:
Y =
[∫ 1
0
q
1

j (yj +D(dj))
−1
 dj
] 
−1
where D is a decreasing function, with D(0) ≥ 0. The inverse demand function can be
written as:
pj = (qjY )
1
 [yj +D(dj)]
− 1

Setting D′(dj) < 0 as in Molinari and Turino (2015), we obtain that advertising acts as
a positive demand shifter. Furthermore, the price-elasticity of demand is equal to:∣∣∣∣∂yj/yj∂pj/pj
∣∣∣∣ = (1 + D(dj)yj
)
Thus, advertising decreases the price-elasticity of demand, ceteris paribus. Intuitively, by
conducting advertising, firms alter the substitutability between goods, and make them more
price-inelastic.
H R&D Tax Credits and Additional Tests
H.1 Description of R&D Tax Credit Measures
This section describes the measures of R&D tax credits which are used in our empirical
investigation of the substitution between R&D and advertising in Section 6.2. First, we use
the statutory credit rate. Second, the tax-adjusted credit rate takes into account the fact
that the tax credit is itself subject to corporate taxation in some states. We compute the
tax-adjusted credit rate for state s at time t as:
Tax adj. Ratest = Statutory Credit Ratest × (1− σst × Tax Ratest)
where σst is the share of the R&D credit which is subject to corporate taxation. When
the credit is taxed, the credit rate is now not only influenced by differences in the statutory
credit rate over time and across states, but also by changes in corporate taxes.
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Third, we use an alternative measure of the marginal effective R&D tax credit, proposed
by Wilson (2009) and available until 2006. This measure acknowledges the different defini-
tions of the R&D expenditures which are eligible for tax credit as well as the horizon over
which the tax credit is calculated. In some states, all R&D expenditures can lead to a tax
credit, while some other states offer a credit only to R&D expenditures above a certain base
level. This threshold can in turn be a moving average of past R&D expenditures. For such
states, the moving-average base is usually computed as the product of firm R&D-to-sales
ratio over the n previous periods times current sales. For a firm with R&D expenditures
above the base level, the marginal effective tax credit rate (mst) is computed as:
mst = Statutory Credit Ratest × (1− σst × τ est)×
(
1− 1
n
n∑
k=1
(1 + rt+k)
−k
)
where r is the real interest rate, n is the number of periods over which the moving-average
base is calculated, and τ est is the effective marginal tax rate which takes into account the fact
that, in some states, taxes paid to the state can be deducted from federal taxable income,
and vice-versa.55
For states with base definition based on the moving-average of past R&D activity, every
dollar spent on R&D today decreases the amount of R&D that qualifies for a tax credit in
the future and hence reduces the effective marginal tax credit rate. In some states such as
New York and Connecticut, all R&D expenditure qualifies for a tax credit (i.e., there is no
moving-average definition of the base level). In this case, the marginal effective credit rate
is equal to the (tax-adjusted) statutory credit rate.
Finally, we use one additional state-level measure of the cost of R&D: the R&D user
cost. This measure was extended from Hall and Jorgenson (1967) to R&D investment by
Bloom et al. (2002), and computed at the U.S. state and federal levels by Wilson (2009). In
particular, the user cost of R&D in state j is given by:
R&D User Costst =
1− v (mst +mft)− z
(
τ est + τ
e
ft
)
1−
(
τ est + τ
e
ft
) (rt + δ)
where the f subscript stands for federal, v is the share of R&D expenditures that qualifies
for preferential tax treatment, z is the present discounted value of tax depreciation allowances,
and δ is the depreciation rate of R&D capital.56
H.2 State-Level Evidence for Advertising-R&D Substitutabil-
ity
In this Appendix, we provide additional evidence on the substitution between advertising
and R&D. We focus on the response of advertising at the state level to changes in R&D tax
credits. Our measure of advertising intensity is the ratio of advertising expenditures within
the state divided by the overall level of sales in the state. We run the following regressions:
log
(
Advst
Salesst
)
= α0 + β1 Tax Creditst + β2Xst + αs + αt + ust (H.1)
for state s at time t, where αt and αs control for time and state fixed effects respectively,
Tax Creditst is a measure of R&D tax credit, andXst is a vector of control variables including
sales in the state, the average age of firms, the average level of equity financing in the state,
55This rate also takes into account the fact that R&D tax credit are subject to corporate taxation in some states.
56Wilson (2009) sets v = 0.5, z = 0.525 and δ = 0.15.
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sales in the state, the average age of firms, the average level of equity financing in the state,
state corporate tax rates, as well as the average selling, general and administrative expense.
Those results confirm the substitutability between R&D and advertising that is predicted
by our model and that was also found at the firm level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
log
(
Adv
Sales
)
Tax credit -0.323
dummy (0.182)
State credit -3.266
rate (1.382)
Tax-adjusted -3.296
state rate (1.389)
Effective -3.246
state rate (1.842)
R&D 2.794
user cost (1.661)
Controls     
Time FE     
State FE     
Observations 1982 1982 1982 1843 1820
R2 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.46
Table A.3: Effect of R&D subsidy on advertising intensity at the state level
Notes: Data from Compustat from 1950 to 2009, Wilson (2009) and Falato and Sim (2014).
Controls include sales (logarithm), age, financial constraint, state tax and selling, general
and administrative expense (logarithm). Age is measured as the elapsed time since the first
observation in the data. Our measure of financial constraints is sale minus purchases of
common and preferred stock, divided by sales. Age and financial constraint are averaged at
the state level. Standard errors are clustered at the state level (in parentheses).
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